The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: The Constitutional Significance of an Unconstitutional Statute by Conkle, Daniel O.
Montana Law Review 
Volume 56 
Issue 1 Winter 1995 Article 3 
1-1-1995 
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: The Constitutional 
Significance of an Unconstitutional Statute 
Daniel O. Conkle 
Indiana University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Let us know how access to this document benefits you. 
Recommended Citation 
Daniel O. Conkle, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: The Constitutional Significance of an 
Unconstitutional Statute, 56 Mont. L. Rev. (1995). 
Available at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol56/iss1/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks at University of Montana. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Montana Law Review by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. 
For more information, please contact scholarworks@mso.umt.edu. 
THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT:
THE CONSTITUTIONAL SIGNIFICANCE OF AN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTE
Daniel 0. Conkle*"
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA)' is a
remarkable statute. Based on Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment,2 the Act explicitly rejects the Supreme Court's re-
strictive interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause, as expressed
in Employment Division v. Smith,3 and offers in its place a
standard that is far more protective of religious freedom. No less
remarkable, RFRA was supported by a legion of divergent inter-
est groups, and it garnered virtually unanimous support in both
the House and the Senate. According to President Clinton, the
Act "reaffirm[s] our solemn commitment to protect the first guar-
antee of our Bill of Rights. In the great tradition of our Nation's
founders, this legislation embraces the abiding principle that our
laws and institutions must neither impede nor hinder, but rather
preserve and promote, religious liberty."4 One supporter of the
Act called it "the most important religious liberty legislation in
our nation's history."5 According to another, "Not since the adop-
tion of the First Amendment [have] the Congress and the presi-
dent done so much for religious freedom."6
t Copyright © 1995, Montana Law Review; Daniel 0. Conkle.
* Professor of Law and Ira C. Batman Faculty Fellow, Indiana University
School of Law - Bloomington.
This Article is based upon a paper that I presented on September 30, 1994, at
the University of Montana School of Law's James R. Browning Symposium for 1994.
The symposium was a delightful experience, both professionally and personally, due
largely to the efforts of Dean Rodney K. Smith and the editors and staff of the Mon-
tana Law Review. During the course of the symposium, I received helpful comments
and questions concerning my paper, both from my fellow symposium participants and
from members of the audience. My thanks go out to all these people. I also wish to
thank Kathleen A. DeLaney for her research assistance, and Marci A. Hamilton and
Scott C. Idleman for their valuable suggestions.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (Supp. V 1993).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
3. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
4. Proclamation No. 6646, 59 Fed. Reg. 2925 (1994) (presidential proclamation
declaring January 16, 1994 "Religious Freedom Day").
5. Clinton Signs Law on Religious Freedom, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 17, 1993, at A2
(quoting John Buchanan, Vice President of People for the American Way).
6. Id. (quoting Henry Siegman, Executive Director of the American Jewish
Congress); see also Douglas Laycock & Oliver S. Thomas, Interpreting the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, 73 TEX. L. REV. 209, 243 (1994) (describing RFRA as "the
most important congressional action with respect to religion since the First Congress
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The First Amendment of the founders, however, was a duly
enacted constitutional amendment, proposed by the Congress
and ratified by the requisite number of states. RFRA, by con-
trast, purports to adopt a national standard of religious free-
dom-and, indeed, to categorically reject the Supreme Court's
constitutional standard-through the device of simple legislation.
In so doing, RFRA circumvents the process of constitutional
amendment, undermining the Supreme Court's role in interpret-
ing the Bill of Rights and in defining the boundary between
national constitutional norms and the reserved powers of the
states. Although its cause is noble, RFRA exceeds the power of
Congress and should be declared unconstitutional in its applica-
tion to state and local governmental practices.
If, as I suggest, RFRA is unconstitutional, its provisions are
not binding on the Supreme Court. As a result, the Court should
reject the statute's vision of religious freedom if the Court contin-
ues to believe that its own interpretation of the Free Exercise
Clause is sound. Even if unconstitutional, however, RFRA is
hardly a constitutional irrelevancy. Our society's contemporary
values are an important source for the Court to consult as it
determines the evolving meaning of the Constitution. And on the
meaning of the Free Exercise Clause, RFRA provides compelling
evidence that American societal values support a generous re-
gime of religious freedom. Indeed, the political support for RFRA
was so widespread as to indicate a national consensus. Coupled
with other arguments, RFRA strongly suggests that the Supreme
Court should reconsider Smith. On this view, the Act does not
supersede the Court's constitutional ruling, but the very fact of
its enactment tends to confirm that the Court's constitutional
ruling was wrong. Even as the Supreme Court declares the stat-
ute unconstitutional, then, it properly could rely on RFRA as a
reason for overruling Smith and for adopting a more generous
interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause.
In Part I of this Article, I discuss the nature and limits of
Congress' power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Part II describes the enactment of RFRA, and Part III explains
why the Act is unconstitutional. In Part IV, I develop my argu-
ment that the Act nonetheless is constitutionally significant and
supports the overruling of Smith. Finally, in Part V, I offer some
concluding observations, explaining the important difference
between treating the Act as legally binding on the Supreme
proposed the First Amendment").
[Vol. 56
2
Montana Law Review, Vol. 56 [1995], Iss. 1, Art. 3
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol56/iss1/3
CONSTITUTIONAL SIGNIFICANCE
Court and treating it instead as relevant and important to the
Court's own interpretation of the Constitution.
I. THE NATURE AND LIMITS OF CONGRESS' POWER UNDER
SECTION 5 OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
In Cooper v. Aaron,7 the Supreme Court wrote that Marbury
v. Madison' "declared the basic principle that the federal judi-
ciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution,
and that principle has ever since been respected by this Court
and the Country as a permanent and indispensable feature of
our constitutional system."9 Although Cooper's interpretation of
Marbury can properly be questioned,'0 it seems clear that the
modern Supreme Court is the primary interpreter of the Consti-
tution, and that the task of constitutional interpretation is the
Court's central and most important function. Most of the Court's
constitutional cases, moreover, involve challenges to state and lo-
cal governmental practices that are alleged to violate the Four-
teenth Amendment, either of its own force or through its incorpo-
ration of Bill of Rights standards. In deciding these challenges to
state and local practices, the Court defines the meaning of con-
stitutionally protected individual freedom. At the same time,
however, it also defines the constitutional boundary between
national and state power, for to decide that the national Consti-
tution protects an individual right is to remove the issue from
state and local control.
Although the Supreme Court is the primary interpreter of
the Fourteenth Amendment and of its Bill of Rights component,
Congress has a significant role as well. In particular, Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment, like the final sections of the Thir-
teenth and Fifteenth Amendments, grants Congress the "power
to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this arti-
cle."" The nature and limits of Congress' enforcement power
are among the deepest questions of contemporary constitutional
law, and they have been explored by the Supreme Court in a
7. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
8. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
9. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 18; see also, e.g., Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486,
549 (1969) (affirming that "it is the responsibility of this Court to act as the ulti-
mate interpreter of the Constitution"); accord United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683,
703 (1974).
10. See, e.g., GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 26-27 (12th ed. 1991).
11. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; see also id. amend. XIII, § 2; amend. XV, §
1995]
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series of modern decisions. Taken together, these decisions per-
mit Congress to supplement and complement the Supreme
Court's constitutional decisionmaking, but not to undermine the
Court's substantive constitutional standards or its basic inter-
pretive function.
A. Congress' Remedial Power
At the very least, the enforcement power permits Congress
to create criminal and civil remedies for individual violations of
the Civil War Amendments, as defined by the Supreme Court.
Beyond this, however, the Court has clearly recognized a broader
"remedial" power, one that permits Congress to modify or even
eliminate the case-by-case process of adjudicating constitutional
violations. Thus, Congress can adopt general statutory provisions
that are designed either to ensure that prior violations of the
Amendments are fully remedied or to guard against the risk of
future violations. Under this remedial theory, however, the exis-
tence or risk of "constitutional violations" depends on the sub-
stantive constitutional interpretation of the Supreme Court. This
theory does not permit Congress to modify the substantive con-
tent of constitutional rights.
In South Carolina v. Katzenbach,"2 the Supreme Court ap-
plied the remedial theory of congressional power in upholding
challenged provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, including
the Act's suspension of literacy tests in certain localities, mainly
in the South. Although the Court had previously ruled that liter-
acy tests, as such, were not necessarily unconstitutional, 3 Con-
gress had evidence that in the covered jurisdictions the tests not
only had been the tool of unconstitutional racial discrimination
in the past, but also were likely to be so misused in the fu-
ture. 4 Explaining the remedial theory of congressional power,
the Court stated: "Congress may use any rational means to effec-
tuate the constitutional prohibition of racial discrimination in
12. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
13. Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
14. South Carolina, 383 U.S. at 312-13. The constitutional prohibition on racial
discrimination in voting is found in the Fifteenth Amendment; the Court in South
Carolina therefore was addressing the congressional enforcement power under that
Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2.
[Vol. 56
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voting."5 Citing McCulloch v. Maryland"5 and Ex parte Virgin-
ia,7 the Court indicated that this power was no less broad than
that available under the Necessary and Proper Clause. 8
Applying this approach, the Court concluded that the Act's
suspension of literacy tests was fully justified:
Congress began work with reliable evidence of actual voting
discrimination in a great majority of the States and political
subdivisions affected by the new remedies of the Act. The for-
mula eventually evolved to describe these areas was relevant to
the problem of voting discrimination, and Congress was there-
fore entitled to infer a significant danger of the evil in the few
remaining States and political subdivisions covered.... .
The record shows that in most of the States covered by the
Act,... various tests and devices have been instituted with the
purpose of disenfranchising Negroes, have been framed in such
a way as to facilitate this aim, and have been administered in a
discriminatory fashion for many years. Under these circum-
stances, the Fifteenth Amendment has clearly been violated.20
This reasoning suggests that Congress' remedial power is quite
substantial. As long as it acts "rationally," Congress can adopt
generalized remedies not only to redress individual constitution-
al violations that might be difficult to prove, but also, it seems,
simply to ensure that the congressional enactment can be imple-
mented without undue administrative burden.2'
15. South Carolina, 383 U.S. at 324. "[In addition to the courts, Congress has
full remedial powers to effectuate the constitutional prohibition against racial discrim-
ination in voting." Id. at 326.
16. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
17. 100 U.S. 339, 345, 346 (1880).
18. South Carolina, 383 U.S. at 326 (referring to U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
18); see also City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 175 (1980); Katzenbach v.
Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650 (1966). The Court in South Carolina quoted with approval
from Ex parte Virginia:
Whatever legislation is appropriate, that is, adapted to carry out the objects
the amendments have in view, whatever tends to enforce submission to the
prohibitions they contain, and to secure to all persons the enjoyment of
perfect equality of civil rights and the equal protection of the laws against
State denial or invasion, if not prohibited, is brought within the domain of
congressional power.
South Carolina, 383 U.S. at 327 (quoting Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. at 345-46).
19. South Carolina, 383 U.S. at 329.
20. Id. at 333-34 (citations omitted).
21. The Supreme Court applied and extended the reasoning of South Carolina
in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970). Although the justices could not agree on
a majority opinion, they unanimously upheld an amendment to the Voting Rights Act
that suspended literacy tests throughout the United States. Justice Harlan explained
his reasoning as follows:
1995]
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City of Rome v. United States" demonstrates the breadth of
this remedial power. In Rome, the Supreme Court addressed the
preclearance provision of the Voting Rights Act, which forbids
covered jurisdictions from adopting certain electoral changes
unless they can prove that such changes not only are racially
nondiscriminatory in purpose, but also in effect.2" The city of
Rome itself had a history of racial neutrality in its voting prac-
tices,24 but it was part of a covered jurisdiction, the State of
Georgia, which did not. Noting that purposeful racial discrimina-
tion is required before a constitutional violation can be found,
the city of Rome argued that at least as applied to it, the
statute's "effect" standard was beyond the power of Congress to
adopt.2"
The Supreme Court disagreed. The Court indicated that
Congress has the power to ensure that prior constitutional viola-
tions are fully remedied, and that it accordingly can prohibit any
state action that "perpetuates the effects" of such prior viola-
tions.2" Applying this reasoning, the Court found "no reason...
to disturb Congress' considered judgment that banning electoral
changes that have a discriminatory impact is an effective method
of preventing States from 'undo[ing] or defeat[ing] the rights
recently won' by Negroes."2" In addition, the Court ruled that
Congress can enact prophylactic measures to guard against the
Despite the lack of evidence of specific instances of discriminatory applica-
tion or effect, Congress could have determined that racial prejudice is prev-
alent throughout the Nation, and that literacy tests unduly lend themselves
to discriminatory application, either conscious or unconscious. This danger of
violation of § 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment was sufficient to authorize the
exercise of congressional power under § 2.
Id. at 216 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Other justices
noted that the suspension of literacy tests also could be seen to redress the effects of
unconstitutional discrimination in public education (this in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment) and, in addition, that Congress could properly consider the interest in
nationwide uniformity-an interest based in part on administrative convenience. See
id. at 133-34 (opinion of Black, J.); id. at 147 (Douglas, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part); id. at 233-36 (Brennan, J., joined by White
and Marshall, JJ., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); id. at
283-84 (Stewart, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and Blackmun, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
22. 446 U.S. 156 (1980).
23. Id. at 172.
24. As Justice Powell noted in his dissenting opinion, "the District Court found,
and no one denies, that for at least 17 years there has been no voting discrimination
by the city of Rome." Id. at 206 (Powell, J., dissenting).
25. Id. at 173 (majority opinion).
26. Id. at 176.
27. Id. at 178 (citations omitted).
[Vol. 56
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risk of present or future constitutional violations.' This reason-
ing also supported the effect standard: "Congress could rationally
have concluded that, because electoral changes by jurisdictions
with a demonstrable history of intentional racial discrimination
in voting create the risk of purposeful discrimination, it was
proper to prohibit changes that have a discriminatory impact.
" 29
In making these judgments, moreover, Congress was perfectly
free to generalize on a statewide basis, without regard to the
particular conditions or history of individual political subdivi-
sions.3 o
The Court's broad reading of Congress' remedial power has
not been unanimously supported. In Rome, for example, three
justices dissented, citing federalism concerns as well as the
judiciary's ultimate responsibility in matters of constitutional
interpretation.3' Even as recognized by South Carolina and
Rome, moreover, Congress' remedial power is not without limit.
Justice Rehnquist accurately characterized this limit in his dis-
senting opinion in Rome, even though he differed from the ma-
jority concerning whether Congress had transgressed it in the
case at hand. Congress' remedial power, he wrote, permits Con-
gress only to "act remedially to enforce the judicially established
substantive prohibitions of the Amendments."32 This power does
not permit Congress to modify the substantive protections of the
Civil War Amendments, as defined by the Supreme Court, but
only to exercise its discretion in formulating remedial measures
to effectuate those protections.
28. Id. at 177.
29. Id. (citations omitted).
30. As Justice Stevens explained in his concurring opinion, "Congress has the
constitutional power to regulate voting practices in Rome, so long as it has the pow-
er to regulate such practices in the entire State of Georgia." Id. at 193 (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
31. See id. at 206 (Powell, J., dissenting) ("ITihe Court today continues federal
rule over the most local decisions made by this small city in Georgia."); id. at 207
(Rehnquist, J., joined by Stewart, J., dissenting) ("While the presumption of constitu-
tionality is due to any act of a coordinate branch of the Federal Government or of
one of the States, it is this Court which is ultimately responsible for deciding chal-
lenges to the exercise of power by those entities.") (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974)).
32. Rome, 446 U.S. at 210 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); cf id. at 213 ("[(Un order
to invoke a remedy, there must be a wrong-and under a remedial construction of
congressional power to enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, that
wrong must amount to a constitutional violation.").
1995]
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B. The Substantive Power Theory
To permit Congress to modify the judicially determined
meaning of the Civil War Amendments would be to grant Con-
gress a "substantive" power of constitutional interpretation.
Under this theory, Congress could do more than remedy viola-
tions of the Amendments, as defined by the Supreme Court.
Instead, Congress could actually determine for itself the substan-
tive meaning of the Amendments, and its determination would
be controlling on the Supreme Court as well as the states. Much
more than Congress' remedial power, a substantive power could
threaten the constitutional role of the Supreme Court, as well as
federalistic values. Even so, the Court has suggested that Con-
gress might possess such a power. The validity of this sugges-
tion, however, is in serious question. And even if Congress does
possess a substantive power, such power is confined to congres-
sional decisionmaking that works to complement, not undermine,
the Supreme Court's exposition of constitutional values.
1. The Supreme Court's Treatment of the Substantive Power
Theory
The strongest argument for a substantive power is derived
from Katzenbach v. Morgan."3 As in South Carolina and Rome,
the Supreme Court in Morgan upheld a provision of the Voting
Rights Act.' According to the challenged provision, no person
who had successfully completed the sixth grade in an accredited
Puerto Rican school, having been instructed in a language other
than English, could be denied the right to vote because of an
inability to read or write English. 5 The effect of this measure,
in the circumstances to which it applied, was to nullify New
York's English literacy requirement." In an opinion authored
by Justice Brennan, the Court upheld the congressional provi-
sion on two alternative theories. 7
First, the Court relied on a remedial theory of congressional
power, holding, as in the later case of Rome, that Congress has
broad discretion not only to redress prior constitutional viola-
33. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
34. Id. at 652-58.
35. Id. at 643 & n.1.
36. Id. at 644-45.
37. Id. at 649-58.
[Vol. 56
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tions, but also to prevent future ones.' Thus, the Court wrote,
the congressional statute "may be viewed as a measure to secure
for the Puerto Rican community residing in New York nondis-
criminatory treatment by government-both in the imposition of
voting qualifications and the provision or administration of gov-
ernmental services, such as public schools, public housing and
law enforcement."39 The "enhanced political power" resulting
from the literacy test's elimination, the Court continued, "will be
helpful in gaining nondiscriminatory treatment in public services
for the entire Puerto Rican community."' Although a broad
reading of Congress' remedial power, this portion of the Court's
opinion apparently viewed the law as a rational congressional
enactment designed to enforce and effectuate the judicially deter-
mined constitutional prohibition on racial discrimination by
government.4'
In a second ground for its ruling, by contrast, the Court
implied that Congress could itself determine the substantive
meaning of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.42 Although alluding to evidence present before
Congress that New York's literacy requirement might have been
racially motivated,' the Court suggested that Congress might
properly have acted to invalidate the requirement on the basis of
broader considerations:
Congress might have also questioned whether denial of a right
deemed so precious and fundamental in our society was a nec-
essary or appropriate means of encouraging persons to learn
English, or of furthering the goal of an intelligent exercise of
the franchise.... Since Congress undertook to legislate so as to
preclude the enforcement of the state law, and did so in the
38. Id. at 652-53.
39. Id. at 652.
40. Id.
41. The Court's remedial rationale accorded great deference to Congress:
It was for Congress, as the branch that made this judgment, to assess and
weigh the various conflicting considerations-the risk or pervasiveness of
the discrimination in governmental services, the effectiveness of eliminating
the state restriction on the right to vote as a means of dealing with the
evil, the adequacy or availability of alternative remedies, and the nature
and significance of the state interests that would be affected .... It is not
for us to review the congressional resolution of these factors. It is enough
that we be able to perceive a basis upon which the Congress might resolve
the conflict as it did.
Id. at 653.
42. Id. at 653-56.
43. Id. at 654 & n.14.
1995]
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context of a general appraisal of literacy requirements for vot-
ing, to which it brought a specially informed legislative compe-
tence, it was Congress' prerogative to weigh these competing
considerations. Here again, it is enough that we perceive a
basis upon which Congress might predicate a judgment that
the application of New York's English literacy requirement...
constituted an invidious discrimination in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause."
This language suggests that Congress might properly have deter-
mined that literacy tests, as such, were unconstitutional, even
though the Supreme Court had previously found to the con-
trary.' Indeed, the language could be read to suggest that just
as the Court will defer to "rational" remedial measures, so too
will it defer to "rational" congressional judgments concerning the
substantive meaning of the Civil War Amendments. An overly
broad interpretation of Morgan's substantive theory, however,
would ignore the context of the Court's discussion.
To be sure, the Supreme Court had ruled previously, in
Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections," that liter-
acy tests were not necessarily unconstitutional. More recent deci-
sions, however, had shed doubt on the reasoning and result in
Lassiter. In these decisions, the Court had declared that the
right to vote was "fundamental" and that, regardless of racial
discrimination, the Equal Protection Clause demanded that any
restrictions on this right "be carefully and meticulously scruti-
nized."47 On the basis of these decisions, the Court in Morgan
embraced "the principle that calls for the closest scrutiny of dis-
tinctions in laws denying fundamental rights."4
44. Id. at 654-56 (citation omitted).
45. Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959). In
Morgan, the Court noted that "Lassiter did not present the question before us here:
Without regard to whether the judiciary would find that the Equal Protection Clause
itself nullifies New York's English literacy requirement as so applied, could Congress
prohibit the enforcement of the state law by legislating under § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment?" Morgan, 384 U.S. at 649.
46. 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
47. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964); see also Harper v. Virginia
Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). Harper, invalidating Virginia's poll tax, was
decided less than three months before Morgan. In Harper, the Court attempted to
distinguish Lassiter, arguing that, unlike a poll tax, a literacy test "has some relation
to standards designed to promote intelligent use of the ballot." Id. at 666 (quoting
Lassiter, 360 U.S. at 51).
48. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 657 (emphasis deleted). The Court noted this principle
in discussing an argument that Congress itself had violated equal protection in not
extending its relief from English literacy requirements to those who had been educat-
ed not in Puerto Rico, but beyond the territorial limits of the United States. The
[Vol. 56
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Under this newly developed strict scrutiny standard, New
York's literacy test would have been in serious jeopardy if the
question of its constitutionality had been directly presented to
the Court.49 In this context, the Court suggested that it would
defer to a rational congressional judgment that the test was in
fact unconstitutional. In effect, the Court was suggesting that it
would permit Congress to apply the Court's standard of strict
scrutiny.0 "[0]ur cases have held that the States can be re-
quired to tailor carefully the means of satisfying a legitimate
state interest when fundamental liberties and rights are threat-
ened," noted the Court, "and Congress is free to apply the same
principle in the exercise of its powers."51 In applying the same
strict scrutiny standard as would the Court, Congress properly
could weigh the governmental interests alleged to support the
literacy test, and it also could evaluate whether the test was a
"necessary" means to their effectuation, given the "fundamental"
interest in voting that was at stake.52
Under this interpretation, Morgan's substantive theory im-
plies that Congress has significant power to elaborate the mean-
ing of the Civil War Amendments. Congress can apply judicially
determined constitutional standards, such as strict scrutiny, to
particular state and local practices, and if it determines that a
state or local practice cannot satisfy the relevant standard, its
determination that the practice is unconstitutional will be hon-
ored by the Supreme Court as long as the determination is ratio-
Court rejected this argument, noting that "the principle that calls for the closest
scrutiny of distinctions in laws denying fundamental rights is inapplicable; for the
distinction challenged by appellees is presented only as a limitation on a reform
measure aimed at eliminating an existing barrier to the exercise of the franchise."
Id. (citation omitted); cf Cardona v. Power, 384 U.S. 672, 674 (1966) (discussing the
possible invalidity of New York's English literacy test as applied to individuals who
were not covered by the federal statute upheld in Morgan).
49. In sharp contrast to the majority, Justice Harlan, in his dissenting opinion
in Morgan, would have evaluated New York's literacy test not under strict scrutiny,
but rather under a highly deferential rational basis standard, according to which the
question was "whether New York has shown that its English language literacy test
is reasonably designed to serve a legitimate state interest." Morgan, 384 U.S. at 661
(Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan concluded that as in Lassiter, the literacy test
could easily meet this "rationality" standard. Id. at 662.
50. See Archibald Cox, The Role of Congress in Constitutional Determinations,
40 U. CIN. L. REV. 199, 234 (1971).
51. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 654 n.15 (citing Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections,
383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966)) (other citations omitted).
52. My interpretation of Morgan tracks that of Professor Jesse H. Choper. See
Jesse H. Choper, Congressional Power to Expand Judicial Definitions of the Substan-
tive Terms of the Civil War Amendments, 67 MINN. L. REV. 299, 308-10 (1982).
19951
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nal.' Two points about Morgan, however, deserve special em-
phasis. First, Morgan's substantive theory was only an alterna-
tive ground of decision; the Court also relied, independently, on
the less controversial remedial theory. Second, the Court did not
permit Congress to repudiate or disregard the Court's basic stan-
dards of substantive constitutional law. In particular, the Court
did not permit Congress to adopt a standard of constitutional
scrutiny that differed from that which the Court itself would
employ.'
Oregon v. Mitchell55  provides added reason to view
Morgan's substantive theory with caution. In a split decision, the
Supreme Court upheld congressional legislation lowering the
voting age to eighteen in federal elections, but ruled that Con-
gress lacked the power to impose the same standard for state
elections. Four justices would have upheld the congressional
action even as to state elections, relying on a theory of substan-
tive congressional power that closely tracked the reasoning of
Morgan." Thus, in the main opinion supporting this view, Jus-
tice Brennan argued that a state denial of voting rights to 18-
year-olds, if challenged directly as a violation of equal protection,
would trigger strict judicial scrutiny;57 that the Court itself
might properly invalidate the denial under that standard;' and
53. It would be considerably more difficult for the Court to sustain a con-
gressional determination that a state law was unconstitutional if the constitutional
standard for testing the state law were rational basis, rather than strict scrutiny or
some other form of heightened review. Because state law almost always can satisfy
the rational basis standard, a congressional finding of unconstitutionality might itself
be regarded as irrational or unreasonable, and therefore of no effect.
54. As Professor Archibald Cox has observed, "Nothing in Morgan suggested
that the Court should defer to Congress in the process of deriving the applicable
legal standard from the [constitutional text] and other sources of law .... " Cox,
supra note 50, at 234.
55. 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
56. See id. at 239-81 (Brennan, J., joined by White and Marshall, JJ., concur-
ring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); id. at 135-44 (Douglas, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
57.
[W]hen exclusions from the franchise are challenged as violating the Equal
Protection Clause, judicial scrutiny is not confined to the question whether
the exclusion may reasonably be thought to further a permissible interest of
the State. "A more exacting standard obtains." In such cases, "the Court
must determine whether the exclusions are necessary to promote a compel-
ling state interest."
Id. at 241-42 (Brennan, J., joined by White and Marshall, JJ., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part) (citations omitted).
58. "We believe there is serious question whether a statute granting the fran-
chise to citizens 21 and over while denying it to those between the ages of 18 and
21 could . . . withstand present scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause." Id. at
[Vol. 56
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that, in any event, Congress could properly declare the denial
unconstitutional even if the Court might not. 9
Under Justice Brennan's opinion here, as under his reason-
ing for the Court in Morgan, Congress would be permitted to
judge the constitutionality of particular state practices. Once
again, however, the opinion suggests only that the Court should
defer to rational congressional judgments in the application of
Court-determined standards of constitutional review. Thus, the
question for Justice Brennan was whether "Congress could ratio-
nally have concluded that denial of the franchise to citizens be-
tween the ages of 18 and 21 was unnecessary to promote any
legitimate interests of the States in insuring intelligent and
responsible voting."' Justice Brennan's opinion, in context, pro-
vides no authority for a broader congressional role that would
allow Congress to select a constitutional standard of its own
choosing.61
More important than Justice Brennan's reasoning in Oregon
is the fact that this reasoning was rejected by a majority of the
Court, which held that Congress did not possess the power to
impose an 18-year-old voting age on the states. Indeed, four
justices explicitly rejected the very notion of a substantive con-
gressional power, even as confined to the application of judicially
determined constitutional standards. Speaking for three justices,
Justice Stewart strained to interpret Morgan merely as an ex-
pansive application of the remedial theory of congressional pow-
er;62 he argued that the case should not be read to give Con-
gress the power "to determine as a matter of substantive consti-
tutional law what situations fall within the ambit of the [Equal
Protection Clause], and what state interests are 'compelling." a
Justice Harlan read Morgan more broadly, but only to forthright-
240.
59. Id. at 246-50, 278-81.
60. Id. at 278.
61. See Choper, supra note 52, at 315-21.
62. In its second ground for upholding Congress' invalidation of New York's
English literacy requirement, according to Justice Stewart, the Court in Morgan
found "that Congress could conclude that the New York statute was tainted by the
impermissible purpose of denying the right to vote to Puerto Ricans," thereby render-
ing the New York statute racially discriminatory in violation of judicially determined
constitutional doctrine. Oregon, 400 U.S. at 295 (Stewart, J., joined by Burger, C.J.,
and Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). This interpretation of
Morgan's second ground is difficult to square with some of the Court's language, but
it would reduce Morgan's second ground, like its first, to a remedial theory of con-
gressional power.
63. Id. at 296.
1995]
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ly reject "the doctrine of deference to rational constitutional
interpretation by Congress, espoused by the majority" in that
case." A fifth justice, Justice Black, wrote a more narrow opin-
ion. He rejected Brennan's reasoning in the case at hand, noting
that the Constitution reserved to the states the power to deter-
mine voter qualifications for their own elections, and that racial
discrimination, the core focus of the Civil War Amendments, was
not at issue.65 But he added that "where Congress legislates in
a domain not exclusively reserved by the Constitution to the
States, its enforcement power need not be tied so closely to the
goal of eliminating discrimination on account of race. " '
Morgan's theory of substantive congressional power must be
regarded as suspect. This theory was only an alternative ground
of decision when the case was decided, and, as Justice Stewart's
opinion in Oregon suggests, Morgan can be interpreted in a man-
ner that eliminates its substantive power reasoning altogeth-
er.67 In more recent cases, the Court has largely avoided the
issue, but there have been judicial statements that seem to
doubt the existence of a substantive power." In any event, the
Court has never embraced the substantive power theory as a
determinative ground of decision. As a matter of precedent, then,
whether Congress has any power of substantive constitutional
interpretation remains in serious question. At the very least,
there is sufficient evidence of judicial skepticism about a sub-
64. Id. at 204 n.86 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (sug-
gesting that such a doctrine was inconsistent with Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137 (1803), and Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958)).
65. Oregon, 400 U.S. at 124-30 (opinion of Black, J.).
66. Id. at 130.
67. Cf City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 220 n.8 (1980) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting) ("It would be particularly inappropriate to construe Katzenbach v.
Morgan as a rejection of the remedial interpretation of congressional powers in view
of this Court's subsequent decision in Oregon v. Mitchell.").
68. In Pennhurst State Sch. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981), for example, the
Court avoided the enforcement power issue by interpreting a federal disability
statute's "bill of rights" provision not to create any substantive rights against the
states, but the Court noted that "[there is of course a question whether Congress
would have the power" to create any such rights beyond those declared by the Court
itself. Id. at 16 n.12. The Court likewise avoided the issue in EEOC v. Wyoming,
460 U.S. 226 (1983), which upheld application of the federal Age Discrimination in
Employment Act to state governments on the basis of the Commerce Clause. See id.
at 243. But four dissenting justices did reach the enforcement power issue, and their
opinion used strong language in rejecting the substantive power theory, at least as
invoked in the case at hand. "Allowing Congress to protect constitutional rights stat-
utorily that it has independently defined," they wrote, "fundamentally alters our
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stantive congressional power to suggest that any such power will
be interpreted narrowly.
2. Considerations of Constitutional Theory and Practice
More than precedent suggests the need for caution in grant-
ing Congress a substantive power of constitutional interpreta-
tion. The Supreme Court is the primary interpreter of the Con-
stitution and, as such, plays a fundamental role in our constitu-
tional system. In the exercise of this function, the Court deter-
mines the meaning of the various provisions of the Constitution,
many of which relate and interact. In so doing, the Court consid-
ers all of the competing values that bear on a given issue, includ-
ing the specific content of particular constitutional provisions as
well as more general constitutional values, such as federalism.
Although not always successful, the Court strives for constitu-
tional standards that are logical and consistent, not only within
each doctrinal area, but also between and among them. Indeed,
the potential for constitutional coherence is one important reason
for allowing the Court, and not some non-judicial institution, the
primary role in constitutional interpretation.
Congressional exercise of a substantive power of constitu-
tional interpretation does not necessarily undermine the Su-
preme Court's primary interpretive function. Rather, the ques-
tion is whether any particular exercise of that power significant-
ly frustrates the Court's role. This question is one of degree.
Congressional action that merely supplements the Court's
decisionmaking is not problematic. For example, as long as Con-
gress accepts the Court's constitutional value judgments and its
basic constitutional standards, Congress should be free to apply
the Court's standards to particular state practices on the basis of
empirical findings that Congress is well-suited to make.69
Much more problematic is congressional action that purports
to reject the Court's basic standards or that otherwise works to
impair the Court's constitutional function. If Congress were per-
mitted to interpret constitutional rights restrictively, for exam-
ple, the congressional action would frustrate the Supreme
69. Congress' role as a fact finder was featured in Morgan and especially in
Justice Brennan's opinion in Oregon. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 653-56; Oregon, 400 U.S.
at 246-50, 278-81 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part); see Archibald Cox, The Supreme Court, 1965 Term-Foreword: Constitutional
Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARv. L. REV. 91, 106-07
(1966); Cox, supra note 50, at 226-39.
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Court's constitutional obligation to protect those rights. Not
surprisingly, the Court has made it clear that it will not coun-
tenance that type of congressional action, noting that whatever
the meaning of Congress' enforcement power, such power does
not permit Congress to "restrict, abrogate, or dilute" constitution-
al rights that the Court is required to protect.70 But other sorts
of congressional action might also interfere with the Court's
obligations. Thus, if Congress were permitted to interpret nation-
al constitutional rights in an overly expansive fashion, this
might frustrate the Constitution's protection of federalism and
the Supreme Court's responsibility to honor that value.7 Like-
wise, congressional action might interfere with the Court's func-
tion in providing constitutional coherence if Congress attempted
to implement its understanding of one constitutional provision
without addressing related fields of constitutional doctrine.
Under this context-specific analysis, the Supreme Court's
divergent results in Morgan and Oregon are not difficult to rec-
oncile. The congressional action at issue in Morgan, construed as
the congressional application of a judicially determined standard
of review, certainly did not go much beyond the Supreme Court's
own interpretation of the constitutional right at issue. Congress
essentially followed the Court's lead, in part on the basis of con-
gressional fact-finding, and it made a narrowly focused decision
that did no more than nullify a particular practice of the State of
New York. As a result, Congress did not intrude on any
federalistic or other constitutional values that the Court felt
obliged to protect.
In Oregon, by contrast, Congress attempted to impose an 18-
year-old voting age on every state. In the view of a majority of
the justices, this action was based on normative constitutional
judgments that were in no way justified by the Court's equal
protection doctrine; relatedly, the congressional action was undu-
ly intrusive on the states. Congress' interpretation of the Four-
teenth Amendment thus conflicted in a serious way with the
justices' own understanding of what the Constitution required.
Unlike in Morgan, Congress was not following the Court's lead.
70. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 651 n.10; Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458
U.S. 718, 732-33 (1982); see also Oregon, 400 U.S. at 249 n.31 (Brennan, J., concur-
ring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
71. But see William Cohen, Congressional Power to Interpret Due Process and
Equal Protection, 27 STAN. L. REV. 603 (1975) (arguing that the Supreme Court gen-
erally should not consider federalistic values in interpreting the scope of congressio-
nal power under § 5).
[Vol. 56
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Instead, it was attempting to lead the Court in a new and dif-
ferent direction.72 Such a fundamental change in the judicially
determined meaning of the Constitution, however, especially
with its implications for states' rights, could not be accomplished
by congressional legislation. It would require a constitutional
amendment.73
II. THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT
A. The Judicial Backdrop
Under the Supreme Court's 1878 decision in Reynolds v.
United States,74 the Free Exercise Clause provided very little
protection for religiously motivated conduct. In more recent de-
cades, however, the Supreme Court's doctrine evolved to provide
significant protection for such conduct, even from laws of general
application. Under Sherbert v. Verner75 and Wisconsin v.
Yoder,76 general laws that had the effect of burdening religious
practices were tested by a standard of strict judicial scrutiny.
Thus, the Court stated in Sherbert that only a "compelling state
interest" could justify a burden on religious practices.77 To the
same effect, the Court in Yoder wrote that "only those interests
of the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbal-
ance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion."" Under
Sherbert and Yoder, if the government could not satisfy strict
scrutiny in justifying the application of a law to religiously moti-
vated conduct, an exemption from the law was constitutionally
required.
Although the Court's test was strict in formulation, its appli-
cation suggested a somewhat more lenient standard of review.79
72. Cf EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 262 (1983) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)
(arguing that Congress cannot "define rights wholly independently of our case law");
Cox, supra note 50, at 254 ("No one suggests that the Congress can read into the
Constitution new general rules of law that have been rejected by the Court, regard-
less of whether they expand or dilute constitutional rights.").
73. Shortly after Oregon was decided, Congress in fact proposed, and the states
ratified, the Twenty-Sixth Amendment to the Constitution. This amendment grants
18-year-olds the right to vote in state as well as federal elections. U.S. CONST.
amend. XXVI.
74. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
75. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
76. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
77. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403.
78. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215.
79. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257-60 (1982); Bob Jones
Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 603-04 (1983).
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In addition, the Court adopted explicit exceptions to strict scruti-
ny for military and prison regulations, which it evaluated under
a reasonableness or rational basis standard.' Outside these
exceptional areas, however, the Court continued to endorse a
relatively demanding standard of review until its 1990 decision
in Employment Division v. Smith."'
Smith marked a dramatic and surprising turn in judicial
doctrine. Although the Court purported to distinguish and pre-
serve its particular rulings in Sherbert and closely similar cas-
es, 82 as well as in Yoder," the Court essentially renounced the
basic free exercise framework that it had been following and re-
verted to the prior doctrine of Reynolds,' holding that general
laws affecting religious practices do not require any form of
heightened judicial review.o
Interpreting the text of the Free Exercise Clause, the Court
rejected the argument "that 'prohibiting the free exercise [of
religion]' includes requiring any individual to observe a generally
applicable law that requires (or forbids) the performance of an
act that his religious belief forbids (or requires)."' The Court
continued: "To make an individual's obligation to obey such a
law contingent upon the law's coincidence with his religious be-
liefs, except where the State's interest is 'compelling'-permitting
80. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507-08 (1986) (military); O'Lone v.
Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348-50 (1987) (prisons). The Court also ruled that
the Free Exercise Clause did not limit the government's internal operations, even if
those operations had an adverse effect on religious practices. See Bowen v. Roy, 476
U.S. 693, 699-701 (1986); Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485
U.S. 439, 447-53 (1988).
81. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
82. Prior to Smith, the Court had reaffirmed and relied upon Sherbert in sev-
eral factually similar contexts. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Hobbie v.
Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of
Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989). The Court in Smith attempted to narrowly
limit these decisions, stating that "[wle have never invalidated any governmental
action on the basis of the Sherbert test except the denial of unemployment compensa-
tion." Smith, 494 U.S. at 883.
83. The Court in Smith explained Yoder as a case involving a hybrid constitu-
tional claim, based not only on the Free Exercise Clause, but also on the constitu-
tional right of parents to control the education of their children. See Smith, 494 U.S.
at 881.
84. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
85. Smith, 494 U.S. at 876-90.
86. Id. at 878 (bracketed language provided by the Court). In so ruling, the
Court did not deny that the "exercise of religion" includes religiously motivated prac-
tices. See id. at 877. But it concluded that general laws are not laws "prohibiting the
free exercise [of religion]," and therefore do not violate the Free Exercise Clause. See
id. at 877-79.
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him, by virtue of his beliefs, 'to become a law unto him-
self,'-contradicts both constitutional tradition and common
sense.""7 According to the Court, "a private right to ignore gen-
erally applicable laws" was not a "constitutional norm," but was
rather "a constitutional anomaly."' The Court especially object-
ed to the prospect of balancing religious claims against compet-
ing state interests in a wide variety of possible contexts, a task
for which, according to the Court, judges are not well-suited. 9
"The First Amendment's protection of religious liberty," the
Court concluded, "does not require this."9 In effect, Smith held
that general laws burdening religious practices do not implicate
the Free Exercise Clause at all, and accordingly do not require
any type of special constitutional scrutiny.
Attempting to mitigate the harshness of its ruling, the Court
suggested that legislatures remained free to adopt religion-based
exemptions, and that they might very well choose to do so. On
the particular issue in Smith, for example, the Court noted that
"a number of States have made an exception to their drug laws
for sacramental peyote use."9 "But to say that a nondiscrimina-
tory religious-practice exemption is permitted, or even that it is
desirable," the Court continued, "is not to say that it is constitu-
tionally required, and that the appropriate occasions for its cre-
ation can be discerned by the courts."9 The Court recognized
that "leaving accommodation to the political process" might place
minority religious practices "at a relative disadvantage," but it
argued that "that unavoidable consequence of democratic govern-
ment must be preferred to a system in which each conscience is
a law unto itself or in which judges weigh the social importance
of all laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs."93
B. The Enactment of RFRA
Although the Smith Court contemplated specific legislative
accommodations, adopted on a state-by-state basis in the context
of particular laws, Congress had a different idea: undoing the
effect of Smith altogether. Introduced soon after the case was
87. Id. at 885 (citing Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 167).
88. Smith, 494 U.S. at 886.
89. Id. at 886-89 & nn.4-5.
90. Id. at 889.
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decided, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act was enacted
some three years later." In RFRA's formal statement of find-
ings and purposes, Congress referred to the First Amendment's
protection of religious free exercise;95 declared that "govern-
ments should not substantially burden religious exercise without
compelling justification;"" and noted that "in Employment Divi-
sion v. Smith, the Supreme Court virtually eliminated the re-
quirement that the government justify burdens on religious exer-
cise imposed by laws neutral toward religion."97
Asserting that "the compelling interest test as set forth in
prior Federal court rulings is a workable test for striking sensi-
ble balances between religious liberty and competing prior gov-
ernmental interests,"98 Congress declared that the purpose of
the Act was "to restore the compelling interest test as set forth
in Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin v. Yoder and to guarantee
its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is sub-
stantially burdened."" To effectuate this purpose, RFRA's pri-
mary substantive provision states that "Government shall not
substantially burden a person's exercise of religion even if the
burden results from a rule of general applicability,""° unless
the government can "demonstrate[ I that application of the bur-
den to the person--(1) is in furtherance of a compelling govern-
mental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of further-
ing that compelling governmental interest." 1
In extending the application of RFRA to state and local laws
and practices,1 2 Congress relied on its enforcement power un-
der Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Although the stat-
ute, on its face, does not cite Section 5 or any other source of
94. The proposed Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1990, H.R. 5377, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1990), was introduced by Representative Solarz on July 26, 1990.
See 136 CONG. REc. H5695 (daily ed. July 26, 1990). In revised form, this proposal
ultimately became law as the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993. The Act
was approved by President Clinton on November 16, 1993. See Peter Steinfels,
Clinton Signs Law Protecting Religious Practices, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1993, at A18.
95. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(1) (Supp. V 1993).
96. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(3).
97. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(4) (citation omitted).
98. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(5).
99. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (citations omitted).
100. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a).
101. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(b).
102. The Act applies to federal, as well as state and local, laws and practices.
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2(1) to (2), 2000bb-3(a) to (b). My focus here, however, is on
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congressional power, 1°3 both the House and Senate Reports
explicitly rely on Section 5.'" These reports, however, do little
to address the difficult issues that this reliance entails. Much to
the contrary, the reports give only cursory attention to the prob-
lem, declaring in summary fashion an extraordinarily broad view
of Congress' power. Disposing of the issue in a single paragraph,
the House Report declares that Congress has "the authority to
provide statutory protection for a constitutional value when the
Supreme Court has been unwilling to assert its authority."105
Although the report concedes that Congress could not take action
that was "prohibited by" or "inconsistent with" any other consti-
tutional provision or objective,0 6 it concludes, without expla-
nation, that the Act "is well within these limits."' 7 The Senate
Report is equally superficial, offering general quotations from
Katzenbach v. Morgan °'8 and Ex parte Virginia1"9 as support
103. It is hard to imagine any plausible source of congressional power other than
§ 5. Even under expansive interpretations such as Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111
(1942), and Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971), for example, the Commerce
Clause is a dubious source of power for this enactment, especially in the absence of
any relevant congressional findings. Any Commerce Clause argument, moreover,
would seem to run-headlong into New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992).
See Ira C. Lupu, Statutes Revolving in Constitutional Law Orbits, 79 VA. L. REV. 1,
56-58 (1993); see also infra notes 159-61 and accompanying text.
104. H.R. REP. No. 88, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., at 9 (1993) [hereinafter HOUSE
REPORT]; S. REP. No. 111, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., at 13-14 (1993) [hereinafter SENATE
REPORT]. The reports also mention the Necessary and Proper Clause of Article I, see
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18, but at least insofar as the law applies to state and
local practices, this clause adds little if anything to § 5.
When coupled with the Act's statement of findings and purposes, the reports'
reliance on § 5 is plainly sufficient to indicate Congress' intention to use that source
of power. See Pennhurst State Sch. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 15-17 (1981) (suggest-
ing that Congress must indicate its intention to rely on § 5, but noting, based on
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976), that Congress satisfies this requirement
when its intention is expressly stated in both the House and Senate Reports on the
legislation in question); EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 243 n.18 (1983) (interpret-
ing Pennhurst as a rule of statutory construction for statutes of ambiguous sub-
stantive meaning and stating that as a matter of constitutional power, Congress need
not expressly recite its reliance on § 5, as long as there is "some legislative purpose
or factual predicate that supports the exercise of that power"); Gregory v. Ashcroft,
501 U.S. 452, 470 (1991) ("Pennhurst established a rule of statutory construction to
be applied where statutory intent is ambiguous.").
105. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 104, at 9.
106. "[L]imits to congressional authority do exist. Congress may not (1) create a
statutory right prohibited by some other provision of the Constitution, (2) remove
rights granted by the Constitution, or (3) create a right inconsistent with an objec-
tive of a constitutional provision." Id.
107. Id.
108. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
109. 100 U.S. 339 (1880).
21
Conkle: The Religious Freedom Restoration Act
Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1995
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
for the assertion that RFRA "falls squarely within Congress'
Section 5 enforcement power."1
At the hearings on RFRA, there was testimony on the issue
of congressional power, and some witnesses, including Professor
Ira C. Lupu, suggested that the Act might be unconstitution-
al."' But Congress apparently was persuaded by other testimo-
ny, notably that of Professor Douglas Laycock."' More general-
ly, it seems that Congress was far more concerned with repudiat-
ing Smith than with the question of whether it had the power to
do so. The question of congressional power, however, is a sepa-
rate and preliminary question of no less constitutional magni-
tude than the merits of the Supreme Court's free exercise doc-
trine. On careful examination, moreover, it can be seen that
RFRA exceeds the scope of Congress' Section 5 power. As a re-
sult, the Act should be declared unconstitutional in its applica-
tion to state and local governmental practices.
III. RFRA: AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTE
As discussed above, Congress has a broad remedial power
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,"' and it may
have a substantive power as well."" Furthermore, there is no
reason to preclude Congress from exercising its power to protect
110. SENATE REPORT, supra note 104, at 14.
111. See, e.g., Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1991: Hearings on H.R. 2797
Before the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the
Judiciary, House of Representatives, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 372-74, 385-94 (May 13 &
14, 1992) [hereinafter House Committee Hearings] (testimony of Professor Ira C.
Lupu); The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Hearing on S. 2969 Before the Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 116-17, 122-25,
127-28 (Sept. 18, 1992) [hereinafter Senate Committee Hearing] (testimony of Bruce
Fein).
112. Professor Laycock initially presented his arguments in an October 3, 1990
letter to the chairman of the House Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Civil
and Constitutional Rights. See Letter from Professor Douglas Laycock to Representa-
tive Don Edwards (October 3, 1990), reprinted in Religious Freedom Restoration Act
of 1990: Hearings on H.R. 5377 Before the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional
Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess., app. at 72 (Sept. 27, 1990) [hereinafter Laycock Letter]. Laycock later offered
testimony before committees in both the House and the Senate. See House Committee
Hearings, supra note 111, at 353-59; Senate Committee Hearing, supra note 111, at
92-97, 129. He has repeated and elaborated his arguments in law review commen-
tary, including especially Douglas Laycock, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act,
1993 B.Y.U. L. REv. 221. Laycock renews his defense of RFRA's constitutionality in
his contribution to this symposium. See Douglas Laycock, RFRA, Congress, and the
Ratchet, 56 MONT. L. REv. 145 (1995).
113. See supra part I.A.
114. See supra part I.B.
[Vol. 56
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First Amendment rights, which, having been incorporated,115
are effectively part of the Fourteenth Amendment.' But RFRA
cannot be defended on a remedial theory, either as I have de-
scribed it or as expanded to include a broader set of institutional
considerations. And, on close examination, a theory of sub-
stantive power is equally unavailing.
A. Congress' Remedial Power
Under such cases as South Carolina"7 and Rome,"' Con-
gress can act to ensure that prior constitutional violations are
fully remedied or to guard against the risk of future violations.
Under this remedial theory of congressional power, however, the
definition of constitutional violations depends on the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the relevant constitutional provi-
sion."9 In Smith,120 the Court held quite clearly that general
laws affecting religious practices do not violate the Free Exercise
Clause.' Instead, the Court suggested, religious practices are
constitutionally protected only from laws that target religion for
special disadvantage.'22
In its findings in RFRA, Congress directly contested the
Supreme Court's belief that general laws do not implicate the
Free Exercise Clause, stating that "laws 'neutral' toward religion
may burden religious exercise as surely as laws intended to
interfere with religious exercise."'23 Congress made no claim
that RFRA was designed merely to remedy past or future viola-
115. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (holding that
the Fourteenth Amendment "embraces the liberties guaranteed by the First Amend-
ment").
116. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 693-99 (1978) (relying on § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment as a source of congressional power to adopt remedial legis-
lation for violations of the Eighth Amendment); see also House Committee Hearings,
supra note 111, at 354 (testimony of Professor Douglas Laycock); Senate Committee
Hearing, supra note 111, at 92 (testimony of Professor Douglas Laycock); Laycock,
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, supra note 112, at 246; Matt Pawa, Com-
ment, When the Supreme Court Restricts Constitutional Rights, Can Congress Save
Us? An Examination of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 141 U. PA. L. REV.
1029, 1095-97 (1993).
117. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
118. City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980).
119. See supra part I.A.
120. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
121. See supra notes 82-93 and accompanying text.
122. In its attempt to explain prior precedents, the Court treated unemployment
cases and hybrid claims as special situations. See supra notes 82-83 and accompany-
ing text.
123. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(2) (Supp. V 1993).
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tions of free exercise rights, as defined in Smith.
It is not surprising that Congress did not advance a remedi-
al argument in support of the Act, because such an argument
would be difficult to maintain. To be sure, a state might target
religion in violation of the Smith standard through a general law
that disguised the legislature's underlying purpose, or a prosecu-
tor might use a general law to persecute religious believers on a
selective basis. In such a situation, RFRA would eliminate the
challenger's difficulties of proof in a manner analogous to other
congressional legislation that the Court has approved on a reme-
dial theory."' But only a small fraction of RFRA's applications
could be justified on this basis. In the vast majority of situations,
general laws are enacted with no thought of their possible appli-
cation to religious practices, and prosecutors are engaged in good
faith efforts to enforce the general policies that these laws are
designed to promote. If RFRA had been limited to laws having a
disproportionate effect on religious practices, a remedial theory
might have been more realistic, but the Act contains no such
limitation. Although the remedial theory permits Congress to
formulate administratively convenient remedies, an argument of
administrative convenience-even under a standard of "rationali-
ty"-simply cannot explain the Act's broad application to general
laws of all sorts. Especially in the absence of relevant congressio-
nal findings or other persuasive evidence that Congress actually
relied on a remedial theory,'25 RFRA cannot be justified on that
basis.
124. For an argument along these lines, see House Committee Hearings, supra
note 111, at 357-58 (testimony of Professor Douglas Laycock); Senate Committee
Hearing, supra note 111, at 95-96 (testimony of Professor Douglas Laycock); Laycock,
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, supra note 112, at 251-52; see also Thomas
C. Berg, What Hath Congress Wrought? An Interpretive Guide to the Religious Free-
dom Restoration Act, 39 VILL. L. REV. 1, 67-68 (1994).
125. Professor Laycock urged Congress to make specific findings that might have
made a remedial theory more plausible. See House Committee Hearings, supra note
111, at 357-58, 398 (urging Congress to find, inter alia, that facially neutral laws
have been used as instruments of active religious persecution and that judicial re-
view of legislative motive is insufficient to protect against this possibility); Senate
Committee Hearing, supra note 111, at 95-96, 129 (making the same recommenda-
tion). But Congress made no such findings. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a) (Supp. V 1993)
(statement of congressional findings).
In arguing that the Smith approach offered too little protection to religious
exercise, the House Report did comment that "legislative motive often cannot be
determined and courts have been reluctant to impute bad motives to legislators."
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 104, at 6. But this language was omitted from the Sen-
ate Report, and neither report made any effort to elaborate a remedial theory.
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B. The Institutional Argument for RFRA's Constitutional
Validity
Professor Laycock has offered an "institutional" argument in
support of RFRA's constitutional validity, an argument charac-
terizing the Act as an exercise of congressional power that goes
beyond the remedial theory, at least as I have described it, but
that falls short of substantive constitutional interpretation. Ac-
cording to Laycock, "the statute would not overrule the Court;
rather, it would create a statutory right where the Court de-
clined to create a constitutional right." 6 "The opinion [in
Smith] is quite clear," he writes, "that the Court does not want
final responsibility for applying the compelling interest test to
religious conduct."127 But he claims that this concern does not
apply to RFRA, precisely because it is a statute: "Under the
statute, the judicial striking of the balance is not final. If the
Court strikes the balance in an unacceptable way, Congress can
respond with new legislation."2 ' In a similar but somewhat dif-
ferent vein, Professor Lupu has suggested that RFRA might be
viewed as a congressional attempt to declare the justiciability of
claims for free exercise exemptions, and that it might properly be
upheld on this type of institutional theory." These institution-
al theories are intriguing, but they depend on problematic inter-
pretations both of Smith and of the Act.
In Smith, the Court did rely heavily on institutional reason-
ing, but this reasoning was not concerned merely, or even pri-
marily, about the finality of judicial balancing. Rather, the Court
objected to the very nature of judicial balancing in this context.
As the Court wrote in Smith, "it is horrible to contemplate that
federal judges will regularly balance against the importance of
general laws the significance of religious practice."30 Needless
126. Laycock Letter, supra note 112, at 73.
127. Id. at 77-78.
128. Id. at 78. Professor Laycock repeats this argument in Laycock, The Reli-
gious Freedom Restoration Act, supra note 112, at 246, 252-54; see also House Com-
mittee Hearings, supra note 111, at 358-59 (testimony of Professor Douglas Laycock);
Senate Committee Hearing, supra note 111, at 96-97 (testimony of Professor Douglas
Laycock).
129. See Lupu, supra note 103, at 59-62; see also Berg, supra note 124, at 65-66;
see generally Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced
Constitutional Norms, 91 HARv. L. REV. 1212, 1240 (1978) (arguing that "where the
Court has, on institutional grounds, stopped significantly short of full enforcement of
a substantive norm of the fourteenth amendment, Congress is empowered by section
5 to address conduct falling within the unenforced margin of the norm").
130. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 889 n.5 (1990); see Scott C.
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to say, RFRA in no way resolves or accommodates this concern,
because the Act requires the very same balancing that the Court
opposes. "'1
Furthermore, the Court in Smith relied not only on institu-
tional reasoning, but also on a substantive analysis of the proper
meaning of the Free Exercise Clause. In particular, the Court
rejected what it described as the "constitutional anomaly" of "a
private right to ignore generally applicable laws,""3 2 the right of
an individual, "by virtue of his beliefs, 'to become a law unto
himself.""33 The Court did not suggest that this asserted right
was an "underenforced constitutional norm,""34 but instead de-
clared that it was not a "constitutional norm" at all.'35 It is dif-
ficult to explain this language in terms of institutional reason-
ing.
136
This language in Smith actually reflects a substantive con-
stitutional value, the value of religious equality. Indeed, the
Court's institutional reasoning was directly linked to this sub-
stantive value, in that the Court was concerned that religious
equality could not be adequately protected by the process of judi-
cial balancing. In this connection, it is important to note that
Justice Stevens provided a critical fifth vote for the majority
opinion in Smith. In joining the Court's renunciation of judicial
balancing, Stevens clearly was influenced by the requirement of
religious equality, a constitutional value on which he has consis-
tently relied in arguing against free exercise exemptions. In
United States v. Lee, for example, Stevens declared that "the
Idleman, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Pushing the Limits of Legislative
Power, 73 TEX. L. REV. 247, 275 (1994) ("The Court suggested that the fundamental
enterprise of examining and weighing the individual importance of religious claims
should not be part of the judicial decisionmaking process at all.").
131. In her contribution to this symposium, Professor Joanne C. Brant argues
that the institutional reasoning of Smith implicates the Supreme Court's power to
determine the limits of its judicial competence, and that RFRA's attempt to overturn
the Court's institutional judgment violates separation of powers for reasons that are
not confined to the context of § 5 legislation. Joanne C. Brant, Taking the Supreme
Court at Its Word: The Implications for RFRA and Separation of Powers, 56 MoNT.
L. REV. 5 (1995).
132. Smith, 494 U.S. at 886.
133. Id. at 885 (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1878)); see
supra notes 82-93 and accompanying text.
134. Cf Sager, supra note 129, at 1239 (arguing that § 5 authorizes Congress to
enforce "underenforced constitutional norms").
135. Smith, 494 U.S. at 886.
136. Cf Idleman, supra note 130, at 317 (arguing that "Smith is not truly an
instance of judicial underenforcement," but rather "represents the Court's best judg-
ment of what the Free Exercise Clause requires").
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principal reason for adopting a strong presumption against
[claims for free exercise exemptions] ... is the overriding inter-
est in keeping the government-whether it be the legislature or
the courts-out of the business of evaluating the relative merits
of differing religious claims," which can create the appearance of
"favoring one religion over another."'37 In the course of reject-
ing the propriety of judicial balancing in Smith, moreover, the
Court included an approving reference to Stevens' reasoning in
Lee.
3 8
In mandating the very process of balancing to which the
Supreme Court so strongly objected, RFRA can hardly be said to
address the Court's concerns. To the contrary, the statute rejects
the Court's institutional reasoning no less than it rejects the
Court's substantive understanding of religious freedom. As such,
RFRA is best understood as an attempt to directly repudiate
Smith's interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause. This under-
standing of the statute is fully supported not only by the Act's
substantive provisions, but also by its legislative history and its
formal statement of findings and purposes. 39
More generally, if an institutional argument could be used to
support the enactment of RFRA, such an argument would be
broadly available to support other congressional attempts to
impose strict scrutiny or other forms of heightened constitutional
review in the face of contrary Supreme Court decisions. Smith is
not unique in its reliance on institutional reasoning. Indeed, an
institutional concern about the difficulties of judicial balancing,
coupled with a concern about the intrusiveness of this process on
the states, is part and parcel of virtually every judicial decision
that declines to adopt heightened review. Whenever the Court
rejects heightened review, it is deciding, in effect, that the advo-
cated individual right is not sufficiently important under the
Constitution to justify the balancing process that such review
entails. Under Smith, for example, heightened review is not
justified when the Court is asked to protect religiously motivated
137. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.2 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring
in the judgment); see also Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 512 (1986) (Stevens,
J., concurring) (reiterating the discriminatory potential of free exercise exemptions
and noting "the interest in uniform treatment for the members of all religious
faiths").
138. "Judging the centrality of different religious practices is akin to the unac-
ceptable 'business of evaluating the relative merits of differing religious claims.'
Smith, 494 U.S. at 887 (citing Lee, 455 U.S. at 263 n.2 (Stevens, J., concurring in
the judgment)).
139. See supra text accompanying notes 95-99, 123, 125.
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conduct from laws of general application. At the same time, the
Court sees a higher constitutional value in protecting individuals
from religiously discriminatory laws, and it therefore is willing
to apply heightened review in that context, even though the
process of judicial balancing is similar to that which the Court
rejected in Smith.4 °
As this discussion suggests, judicial decisions rejecting
heightened constitutional scrutiny typically involve a complex
interplay of substantive and institutional considerations. As a
result, it is misleading to claim that congressional action re-
nouncing this type of judicial decision does not involve substan-
tive constitutional interpretation. In any event, the institutional
argument in support of RFRA misreads the Supreme Court's
institutional reasoning in Smith, and it seriously underestimates
the importance of substantive considerations in the Court's deci-
sion. This argument also misreads the Act itself, which clearly
reflects a substantive disagreement with the Court. A more
forthright evaluation of RFRA requires that it be characterized
as an act of substantive constitutional interpretation.
C. The Substantive Power Theory
The ultimate question, then, is whether RFRA can be de-
fended on a substantive power theory. As I have explained,
Morgan's substantive theory'41 is suspect as a matter of pre-
cedent, and it has never been employed as the determinative
basis for upholding a congressional enactment.' Rather than
reject a substantive power altogether, however, the Supreme
Court should permit Congress to exercise such a power as long
as the congressional action does not frustrate the Court's essen-
tial function as the primary interpreter of the Constitution."4
Unfortunately, RFRA frustrates this function in a very serious
way, and it therefore should be declared unconstitutional.
1. RFRA's Direct Repudiation of the Supreme Court's Basic
Constitutional Doctrine
The congressional action in Morgan, even if viewed as an
140. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct.
2217, 2233-34 (1993).
141. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 654-56 (1966).
142. See supra part I.B.1.
143. See supra part I.B.2.
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exercise in substantive constitutional interpretation, served
merely to supplement the Supreme Court's basic approach to
voting rights, with the Court, in effect, permitting Congress to
apply the judicially determined standard of strict constitutional
scrutiny. As a result, the congressional action did little if any-
thing to upset the Court's articulation of constitutional values,
including the value of equal protection and, relatedly, the com-
peting value of federalism.'"
In RFRA, by contrast, Congress has directly rejected the
basic constitutional reasoning of Smith. The Act is based not on
legislative fact-finding, but rather on a congressional under-
standing of constitutional values that differs from the Supreme
Court's.'45 The Act does not apply a judicially determined stan-
dard of review. To the contrary, it purports to mandate a stan-
dard of review that the Supreme Court has explicitly reject-
ed. 4" For Congress simply to repudiate the Supreme Court's
basic constitutional doctrine is entirely unprecedented. By its
very nature, such action is constitutionally suspect, for it chal-
lenges a basic principle of the proper separation of powers.'47
144. See supra notes 42-54 and accompanying text.
145. As Professor Lupu noted in his congressional testimony concerning RFRA:
Congress would not be going in the same direction as the Court. The
Congress would be going very far in the opposite direction. And the judg-
ment would be based on constitutional values, commendable ones, but not
the values that the Supreme Court has expressed.
[The Act does not rest on any claim, general or particular, of
legislative superiority in fact-finding, and thus cannot draw upon that line
of reasoning.
House Committee Hearings, supra note 111, at 374, 391 (testimony of Professor Ira
C. Lupu).
146. In a final footnote to its brief discussion of congressional power, the Senate
Report on RFRA seemingly recognized that this might be problematic:
While the act is intended to enforce the right guaranteed by the free exer-
cise clause of the first amendment, it does not purport to legislate the stan-
dard of review to be applied by the Federal courts in cases brought under
that constitutional provision. Instead, it creates a new statutory prohibition
on governmental action that substantially burdens the free exercise of reli-
gion, except where such action is the least restrictive means of furthering a
compelling governmental interest.
SENATE REPORT, supra note 104, at 14 n.43. Standing alone, this formalistic state-
ment does nothing to support the constitutionality of the Act. Of course the statute's
standard is statutory. What else could it be?
However unartfully, perhaps this footnote was alluding to Professor Laycock's
institutional argument in support of RFRA's constitutional validity. See supra notes
126-28 and accompanying text.
147. Professor Rex E. Lee has described the question of RFRA's constitutionality
as follows:
[Riather patently, Congress proposes a very different standard of review
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More specifically, it threatens the Court's role as the primary in-
terpreter of the Constitution, as symbolized by Marbury v. Madi-
son.
148
If this type of congressional action is ever acceptable, it is
certainly not in the case of RFRA, because there are additional
reasons, beyond the basic separation-of-powers problem, for find-
ing the Act unconstitutional. In particular, RFRA is well re-
moved from the core historical meaning of Section 5, it frustrates
the Court's protection of federalistic values, and it impairs the
Court's role in providing coherent constitutional doctrine.
14
1
2. Congress' Reliance on Section 5 in a Nonracial Context
Although Congress' enforcement power properly extends to
incorporated rights, 5' this extension goes beyond the core his-
torical meaning of the Civil War Amendments. These Amend-
ments, including the Fourteenth Amendment and its enforce-
ment provision, were designed primarily to address the problems
of slavery and racial discrimination. When Congress acts to ad-
dress these problems, its enforcement power is at its zenith, and
the Supreme Court is and should be especially inclined to defer
to congressional decisionmaking."5' As Justice O'Connor wrote
[than that of the Supreme Court in Smith], and therefore a very different
rule of constitutional law. Can the Congress of the United States simply lay
down a completely different rule of constitutional law, and if so, has the
core function of a coordinate branch of government been completely eviscer-
ated?
Rex E. Lee, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Legislative Choice and Judicial
Review, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 73, 90; cf Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G.
Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience: The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Reli-
gious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. REv. 1245, 1309 (1994) (arguing that RFRA "directs the
Court to ... act as though it had changed its mind about the constitutional status
of religious exemptions, or as though it were obliged to accept Congress's judgment
about the meaning of the Constitution as decisive").
148. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
149. These considerations also provide additional reasons for rejecting attempts
to defend RFRA on the basis of unduly expansive remedial or institutional argu-
ments. See supra parts III.A. & III.B.
150. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
151. As discussed previously, South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966),
and City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980), each granted Congress
broad remedial power to deal with racial discrimination. See supra notes 12-30 and
accompanying text. Similar reasoning informed that portion of the Court's decision in
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970), that upheld Congress' nationwide suspension
of literacy tests. See supra note 21. It also was the basis for at least the first
ground of decision in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966). See supra notes
38-41 and accompanying text.
Other cases confirm that the Supreme Court is especially inclined to uphold
30
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in Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., "The Civil War Amendments
themselves worked a dramatic change in the balance between
congressional and state power over matters of race."'52 To the
same effect is Justice Black's opinion in Oregon v. Mitchell, in
which he suggested that Congress' enforcement power may be
broadest when it is tied "to the goal of eliminating discrimination
on account of race."'63
RFRA, of course, does not address slavery or racial discrimi-
nation. Instead, it represents an attempt by Congress to protect
incorporated rights. As a result, the core historical meaning of
the Civil War Amendments is not implicated, and there is less
reason for the Court to defer to congressional decisionmak-
ing.154
Indeed, to sanction a congressional repudiation of the Su-
preme Court's substantive standards in the context of incorporat-
ed rights could create a broad precedent, suggesting that Con-
gress could reject the Court's constitutional views in a wide vari-
ety of areas. It might imply, for example, that Congress could
declare the death penalty invalid under the Eighth Amendment.
Likewise, it might suggest that Congress, interpreting the Tak-
ings Clause of Fifth Amendment, could mandate greater protec-
tion for property rights than the Supreme Court has afforded in
its decisions under that clause. Thus, for the Court to uphold
congressional decisionmaking on matters of race. In Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,
392 U.S. 409 (1968), for example, the Court held that the Thirteenth Amendment's
enforcement provision permits Congress to ban private racial discrimination as a
"badge" or "incident" of slavery. See id. at 437-44. Likewise, the Court has granted
Congress the discretion to use remedial racial classifications that would violate equal
protection if adopted at the state or local level. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S.
448, 476-78 (1980) (plurality opinion) (relying in part on § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment as a basis for upholding congressionally mandated racial set-asides for
state and local government contracts); see also Metro Broadcasting, Inc., v. FCC, 497
U.S. 547, 563-66 (1990) (holding that congressionally approved racial preferences are
subject to more lenient judicial scrutiny than similar preferences adopted at the state
or local level).
152. Richmond v. JA. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 490 (1989) (plurality opinion).
153. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 130 (1970) (opinion of Black, J.).
154. Needless to say, the full historical meaning of the Civil War Amendments,
including especially the Fourteenth Amendment, is a matter of continuing debate,
and there are plausible historical arguments that support the incorporation of free
exercise values. Cf. Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Free Exercise Clause:
Religious Exemptions Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 1106
(1994) (arguing that the history of the Fourteenth Amendment, viewed in part as a
reaction to the Southern suppression of slave religion, can be read to include protec-
tion for religious free exercise). But my argument depends only on my description of
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RFRA could have far-reaching implications for the Court's inter-
pretive role-implications extending far beyond the particular
context of religious freedom.'55
3. The Constitutional Policy of Federalism
Federalism is an additional factor that weighs against the
constitutionality of RFRA. As compared to Smith, the Act is far
more intrusive on the constitutionally reserved powers of the
states. Indeed, one of the Court's concerns in Smith was to limit
the role of "federal judges" in second-guessing the decisions of
the states in balancing the value of religious freedom against
competing governmental interests.5 ' Under Smith, there is no
national constitutional norm that limits state discretion in this
fashion. Rather, the states remain free (subject to the Establish-
ment Clause) 57 to grant or to refuse religion-based exemptions,
either as a matter of legislation or as a matter of state-court
decisionmaking on the basis of state constitutional law.'
By its very nature, moreover, RFRA cuts to the heart of
state sovereignty. As the Court explained in New York v. United
States, it is one thing for Congress to extend private-sector regu-
lations to the comparable activities of state and local govern-
ments; it is something altogether different, and more troubling,
for Congress to address its legislation to government alone, effec-
tively requiring state and local bodies to govern in a particular
way."' 9 "While Congress has substantial powers to govern the
Nation directly, including in areas of intimate concern to the
155. Professor Robert A. Burt has suggested that for the Supreme Court to rec-
ognize "that Congress has, to whatever degree, an 'independent' role in interpreting
the Constitution . . . is likely to remove an important restraint on Congress which
has, in the past, usually counseled great wariness in trespassing on the Court's pre-
rogatives." Robert A. Burt, Miranda and Title II: A Morganatic Marriage, 1969 SuP.
CT. REV. S1, 133. Although Burt believes that this danger "may be overstated," see
id. at 134, there certainly would be serious grounds for concern if the Court were to
recognize a broad congressional power of constitutional interpretation in the context
of incorporated rights. See generally Idleman, supra note 130, at 306-26 (arguing that
the nature of incorporated rights, as well as the judicial reasoning process through
which they were incorporated, may imply limitations on Congress' § 5 power to en-
force these rights).
156. The Court stated that "it is horrible to contemplate that federal judges will
regularly balance against the importance of general laws the significance of religious
practice." Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 889 n.5 (1990).
157. See infra notes 185-87 and accompanying text.
158. For an extensive discussion of the potential role of state constitutional law
in this context, see Angela C. Carmella, State Constitutional Protection of Religious
Exercise: An Emerging Post-Smith Jurisprudence, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REv. 275.
159. See New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2420 (1992).
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States," the Court wrote, "the Constitution has never been un-
derstood to confer on Congress the ability to require the States
to govern according to Congress' instructions."60 Although
RFRA does not directly mandate state lawmaking, it would ap-
pear to be at odds with the reasoning of New York. The Act is
targeted at state and local governments, 6 ' and, in effect, it
mandates that state and local laws include religion-based exemp-
tions according to the Act's criteria.
To be sure, New York was primarily addressed to Congress'
power under the Commerce Clause, a power that typically is
used for regulating the private sphere. Legislation under Section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, by contrast, inevitably targets
state and local governments. As a result, the reasoning of New
York plainly cannot be extended to this setting. Even so, the
Court's federalistic vision is not irrelevant. To the contrary, it
suggests that legislation under Section 5 is exceptional in our
constitutional scheme of federalism, and that Section 5 should be
interpreted within the context of this general scheme. Like other
legislation under Section 5, RFRA tends to undermine
federalistic values, and this is a factor that must be considered
in determining the constitutionality of the Act.6 2
4. The Supreme Court's Role in Developing Coherent
Constitutional Doctrine
Beyond its intrusion on the value of federalism, RFRA frus-
160. Id. at 2421.
161. The Act applies to federal, as well as state and local, laws and practices.
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2(1) to (2), 2000bb-3(a) to (b) (Supp. V 1993). But it does
not apply to the private sector, and therefore it does not "govern the Nation direct-
ly." New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2421.
162. The Supreme Court has ruled that principles of state sovereignty that
might limit congressional power under Article I do not apply when Congress properly
invokes its enforcement power under the Civil War Amendments. City of Rome v.
United States, 446 U.S. 156, 178-80 (1980); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456
(1976). This doctrine is sound. My point is simply that the policy of federalism
should bear on the question of whether Congress in fact has "properly invoked" its
enforcement power. Cf Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 467-70 (1991) (holding that
absent a plain statement, congressional legislation under § 5 will not be interpreted
to reach certain state political functions); id. at 469 ("Mhe Fourteenth Amendment
does not override all principles of federalism."); Pennhurst State Sch. v. Halderman,
451 U.S. 1, 16 (1981) ("Because [legislation under § 5] imposes congressional policy
on a State involuntarily, and because it often intrudes on traditional state authority,
we should not quickly attribute to Congress an unstated intent to act under its au-
thority to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment."); EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226,
259 (1983) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("The Tenth Amendment was not, after all, re-
pealed when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified: it was merely limited.").
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trates the Supreme Court's development of coherent constitution-
al doctrine. In several respects, the Act undermines the develop-
ment of logical, consistent, and harmonious constitutional law
not only under the Free Exercise Clause, but also under the
Establishment Clause and other constitutional provisions.
First, RFRA creates a significant doctrinal inconsistency in
the treatment of prisoners' rights. Thus, even as it repudiated
Smith, the Act also renounced the Court's pre-Smith ruling in
O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz,'" which held that the free exer-
cise claims of prisoners would be tested under a standard of rea-
sonableness, rather than strict scrutiny.' O'Lone, however,
was not simply a free exercise case; rather, it was part of a
broader doctrine concerning the constitutional rights of prison-
ers. Quoting Turner v. Safley,'65 the Court in O'Lone stated the
constitutional standard in general terms: "[When a prison regu-
lation impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation
is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological inter-
ests."6' In Turner, for example, the Court applied this test in
rejecting a freedom of expression claim.167 RFRA undermines
the Court's development of consistent doctrine concerning the
rights of prisoners by speaking selectively to the issue of free
exercise.68
Second, RFRA's interaction with freedom of expression could
create more general doctrinal confusion. In particular, if the Act
is deemed to apply to religiously motivated speech, such speech
presumably would be protected, under the statute's strict scruti-
ny standard, even from content-neutral time, place, and manner
163. 482 U.S. 342 (1987).
164. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 104, at 9-11 (indicating that RFRA would
repudiate O'Lone, but suggesting that the Act's strict scrutiny could be applied with
appropriate sensitivity to prison needs); accord HOUSE REPORT, supra note 104, at 7-
8. The Senate considered but rejected an amendment that would have excluded
prisoners' claims from the reach of the Act. See 139 CONG.-REC. S14353-68 (daily ed.
Oct. 26, 1993); id. at S14461-68 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1993); see also infra note 257.
165. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
166. O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 349 (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 89).
167. Turner, 482 U.S. at 91-93. Even under the reasonableness standard, the
Court in Turner invalidated a prison regulation that generally prohibited inmates
from marrying. Id. at 94-99.
168. In its application to federal laws, RFRA creates a similar inconsistency in
the treatment of military claims. By extending strict scrutiny to the free exercise
claims of service personnel, RFRA renounces the Supreme Court's decision in
Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986). See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 104, at
7-8; SENATE REPORT, supra note 104, at 11-12. Here again, however, Goldman was
not simply a free exercise case, but was part of the Court's more general elaboration
of individual rights in the military context. See Goldman, 475 U.S. at 507-08.
[Vol. 56
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regulations. But the Supreme Court does not apply strict scruti-
ny to such laws, regardless of whether the affected speech is
religious or nonreligious. 9 Recognizing this potential problem,
the House and Senate Reports on RFRA each state that "where
religious exercise involves speech, as in the case of distributing
religious literature, reasonable time, place and manner restric-
tions are permissible consistent with First Amendment jurispru-
dence."170 The face of the statute, however, suggests no such
exception, and it may be difficult to construe the Act in the man-
ner that the reports suggest.1
7 1
Third, RFRA complicates the development of coherent judi-
cial doctrine in those free exercise cases that the Act does not
address. For example, the Court has ruled that the Free Exercise
Clause does not limit the government's internal operations, even
if those operations have an adverse effect on religious practic-
es.17 ' These rulings, however, were part of a general judicial
trend to interpret the Free Exercise Clause narrowly, a trend
that culminated in Smith. Indeed, the Court in Smith relied
upon these decisions as support for its ruling.7  RFRA repudi-
ates Smith, but it appears to leave the internal operations cases
unaffected. 74  Although these cases were entirely consistent
169. As the Court explained in Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence,
468 U.S. 288 (1984):
Expression, whether oral or written or symbolized by conduct, is subject to
reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions. We have often noted that
restrictions of this kind are valid provided that they are justified without
reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly
tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and that they leave
open ample alternative channels for communication of the information.
Id. at 293.
170. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 104, at 9; SENATE REPORT, supra note 104, at
13.
171. To reach the interpretation suggested by the reports, the Court might con-
strue the "exercise of religion" to exclude religious speech, or, more plausibly, it
might determine that content-neutral time, place, and manner regulations do not
"substantially" burden the exercise of religion. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-l(a), 2000bb-
2(4) (Supp. V 1993).
172. See Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699-701 (1986); Lyng v. Northwest Indian
Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 447-53 (1988).
173. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 883 (1990).
174. These cases were decided on the theory that internal governmental opera-
tions do not directly or indirectly coerce individuals to take action that their religion
forbids, and therefore do not impose a legally cognizable "burden" on free exercise.
RFRA applies only to laws that "substantially burden" the exercise of religion, and
the Act says nothing to suggest that Congress' understanding of "burden" is any
different from the Supreme Court's. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a) (Supp. V 1993); see
also SENATE REPORT, supra note 104, at 9 & n.19 (expressing "neither approval nor
disapproval" of the Supreme Court's internal operations decisions, which found no
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with the direction of Smith, they are arguably in tension with
the direction of RFRA, creating a possible incongruity in the law
of free exercise.'75
RFRA likewise leaves unimpaired (as it must) the constitu-
tional strict scrutiny of laws that discriminate against religion, a
scrutiny that survived the Court's decision in Smith.'76 At the
same time, however, RFRA adds a preliminary layer of statutory
strict scrutiny for such laws, because RFRA applies without
distinction to discriminatory as well as general laws. 177 If the
strict scrutiny standard of the Act is identical to the constitu-
tional standard, this is not problematic. But the standards in
fact may differ. Although its basic substantive provision adopts a
strongly worded description of strict scrutiny,17 RFRA could be
read to embrace a more lenient version of this test. 79 In the
.cognizable 'burden' on anyone's exercise of religion"); 139 CONG. REC. S14365 (daily
ed. Oct. 26, 1993) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (asserting that RFRA would leave the
Court's internal operations decisions unimpaired). But cf HOUSE REPORT, supra note
104, at 6 (stating that RFRA would cover all governmental actions having "a sub-
stantial external impact on the practice of religion," regardless of whether such ac-
tions "coerce individuals into violating their religious beliefs"); Laycock & Thomas,
supra note 6, at 229 (suggesting that this language from the House Report was not
designed to address the general problem of internal governmental operations, but
rather was intended to extend the Act's coverage to "an unusual set of cases," those
involving governmental autopsies that may not "coerce" anyone, but that deeply of-
fend the religious beliefs of the decedent or of the decedent's family).
175. In Smith, the Court indicated that it did not believe that the government's
internal operations should be treated differently, for free exercise purposes, than
other governmental laws and practices: "[It is hard to see any reason in principle or
practicality why the government should have to tailor its health and safety laws to
conform to the diversity of religious belief, but should not have to tailor its manage-
ment of public lands or its administration of welfare programs." Smith, 494 U.S. at
885 n.2 (citing Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439;
Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693).
176. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct.
2217, 2233 (1993) ("A law burdening religious practice that is not neutral or not of
general application must undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny.").
177. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a) (Supp. V 1993) (stating that the Act applies "even if
the burden [on religious exercise] results from a rule of general applicability") (em-
phasis added).
178. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(b).
179. In its statement of purposes, the Act refers to "the compelling interest test
as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205 (1972)." 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1). In its statement of findings, however, it
refers more generally to "sensible balances" that were reached under "the compelling
interest test as set forth in prior Federal court rulings [i.e., prior to Smith]." 42
U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(5). Some of the "Federal court rulings" prior to Smith, although
following Sherbert and Yoder in form, applied a rather lenient version of strict scruti-
ny. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. The Act provides protection, moreover,
only from laws that "substantially" burden the exercise of religion, arguably confirm-
ing the need for "sensible balancing" by the courts. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a); see
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constitutional evaluation of discriminatory laws, by contrast, the
Court's scrutiny is unquestionably demanding, so much so that it
can rarely be satisfied.8 ' The possible disparity between these
two "strict scrutiny" standards adds an interpretive complication
that did not previously exist.''
Fourth, and perhaps more important, RFRA could inhibit
the judicial reconsideration of Smith's interpretation of the Free
Exercise Clause. RFRA, if valid, provides religion-based exemp-
tions as a matter of statute, potentially making it unnecessary or
inappropriate for the Supreme Court to reconsider Smith on its
constitutional merits.'82 Smith has been harshly criticized from
the day it was decided, however, and, absent RFRA, the Court
certainly would be asked to revisit the ruling. Furthermore,
there is a real possibility that the Court, on reconsideration,
might abandon Smith in favor of a more generous approach."s
also HOUSE REPORT, supra note 104, at 7 (stating that "the test [under RFRA] gener-
ally should not be construed more stringently or more leniently than it was prior to
Smith"); SENATE REPORT, supra note 104, at 9 (following the language of the House
Report in repeating that "the test [under RFRA] generally should not .be construed
more stringently or more leniently than it was prior to Smith").
For discussions of this and related interpretive issues, see Laycock & Thomas,
supra note 6, at 221-36 (arguing that RFRA should be construed to require a strin-
gent version of strict scrutiny); Michael S. Paulsen, A RFRA Runs Through It: Reli-
gious Freedom and the U.S. Code, 56 MONT. L. REV. 249 (1995) (arguing that RFRA
should be construed to require a stringent version of strict scrutiny, at least insofar
as the Act applies to the federal government); Berg, supra note 124, at 18-62 (ar-
guing that RFRA should be construed to require a form of heightened scrutiny that
provides moderately strong protection for religious practices); Idleman, supra note
130, at 266-86 (arguing that RFRA might be interpreted to provide very little protec-
tion for religious practices); Lupu, supra note 103, at 62-66 (describing various inter-
pretive possibilities); Ira C. Lupu, The Lingering Death of Separation, 62 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 230, 273-76 (1994) (arguing that amendments incorporated into the final
version of RFRA tend to weaken the Act's strict scrutiny standard); Ira C. Lupu, Of
Time and the RFRA. A Lawyer's Guide to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 56
MONT. L. REv. 171 (1995) [hereinafter Lupu, A Lawyer's Guide] (discussing various
interpretive issues and suggesting that RFRA could be construed narrowly to help
protect its constitutional validity).
180. As the Court explained in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City
of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993):
The compelling interest standard that we apply once a law fails to meet
the Smith requirements is not "water[edl . . . down" but "really means
what it says." A law that targets religious conduct for distinctive treatment
or advances legitimate governmental interests only against conduct with a
religious motivation will survive strict scrutiny only in rare cases.
Id. at 2233 (quoting Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888 (1990)).
181. If RFRA is interpreted to embrace a lenient version of strict scrutiny, this
might also have a complicating and adverse effect on the meaning of constitutional
strict scrutiny in nonreligious contexts. See Lupu, supra note 103, at 66.
182. See Laycock, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, supra note 112, at 254.
183. The rule of Smith was adopted over the vigorous opposition of four justices.
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Even as it repudiates the basic reasoning of Smith, the Act could
have the effect of freezing an unsettled and controversial inter-
pretation of the Free Exercise Clause.'
Finally, RFRA may adversely affect the Court's elaboration
of the Establishment Clause, the First Amendment's counterpart
to the Free Exercise Clause. These two provisions are closely
related. Taken together, they decree a type of religious neutrali-
ty, such that government can neither favor nor hinder the exer-
cise of religion. The meaning of this neutrality and the relation-
ship between the two clauses have long been a matter for judi-
cial consideration and decision. Although the Court's Establish-
ment Clause doctrine forbids the government to promote religion,
for example, it has been construed to permit religion-based ex-
emptions from governmentally imposed burdens.185 The limits
of this permissible accommodation, however, remain a matter of
dispute and contention."18 Moreover, these Establishment
Clause limits depend in part on the extent to which the Free
Exercise Clause itself requires accommodations. Thus, the
See Smith, 494 U.S. at 891-907 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at
907-21 (Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan and Marshall, JJ., dissenting). The Court
reaffirmed Smith in Hialeah, see 113 S. Ct. at 2226, but that case involved a statute
that discriminated against religion, and the Court therefore could and did invalidate
the statute without revisiting the Smith approach. See id. at 2234; see also id. at
2241-43 (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (explaining
why the Court's discussion of the rule of Smith was dicta). Even so, three justices
suggested that they would be inclined to reject the rule of Smith in a case that
properly presented the issue. See id. at 2243-50 (Souter, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment); id. at 2250-51 (Blackmun, J., joined by O'Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment). But cf Laycock, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act,
supra note 112, at 255 (arguing that "there is little near-term prospect that the
Court will reconsider Smith").
184. Cf Laycock, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, supra note 112, at 254
(stating that "RFRA may eliminate whatever chance exists of correcting the constitu-
tional law of free exercise").
If RFRA is declared invalid, by contrast, the viability of Smith once again
becomes a pertinent and pressing issue for the Supreme Court's consideration. See
infra parts IV & V. Indeed, the viability of Smith might become a relevant question
as soon as the constitutionality of RFRA is seriously put in issue. See infra note 260
(discussing the argument that RFRA might be constitutional if the Court revised its
constitutional doctrine to conform to the statutory provisions of the Act).
185. See, e.g., Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987)
(upholding a statutory exemption for religious organizations from a ban on religious
discrimination in employment); id. at 338 ("Where, as here, government acts with the
proper purpose of lifting a regulation that burdens the exercise of religion, we see no
reason to require that the exemption come packaged with benefits to secular enti-
ties.").
186. See, e.g., Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989) (invalidating a
Texas sales tax exemption that was granted to religious literature, but not to other
literature).
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meaning of the Establishment Clause depends in part-perhaps
in significant part--on the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause.
To the extent that RFRA freezes the Court's interpretation of the
Free Exercise Clause, then, the Act may also impair the Court's
Establishment Clause decisionmaking11
7
187. If an accommodation required by RFRA were determined to exceed the lim-
its of the Establishment Clause, of course, the Court would be required to reject the
accommodation, for Congress clearly has no power to "restrict, abrogate, or dilute"
the meaning of any provision in the Bill of Rights. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S.
641, 651 n.10 (1966); Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 732-33
(1982); see supra note 70 and accompanying text. Indeed, one could argue that
RFRA's scheme of religious accommodations promotes religion to the point that the
Act on its face violates the Establishment Clause, and that it therefore should be
declared unconstitutional on that ground alone. Cf Idleman, supra note 130, at 286-
306 (arguing that RFRA might be vulnerable to such a challenge and that its valid-
ity under the Establishment Clause is an open question). Because the Act does no
more than protect religion from governmentally imposed burdens, however, this facial
argument would be difficult to maintain. See Amos, 483 U.S. at 334 ("There is ample
room under the Establishment Clause for 'benevolent neutrality which will permit
religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and without interference.") (citation
omitted).
The Court's most recent Establishment Clause case suggests that RFRA's gen-
eralized scheme of accommodations might actually mitigate one Establishment Clause
concern, the risk of selective accommodations that discriminate among similar reli-
gious claims. See Board of Educ. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481, 2491-93 (1994) (reject-
ing an accommodation argument, in part because of a concern that the state's prefer-
ential treatment for a particular religious group would not be extended to similar
groups); id. at 2493 ("[Wlhatever the limits of permissible legislative accommodations
may be, it is clear that neutrality as among religions must be honored.") (citations
omitted).
The fact that RFRA's accommodations are limited to the "exercise of religion"
could raise an Establishment Clause issue. See Grumet, 114 S. Ct. at 2496-97
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (suggesting that
accommodations must be extended, in a nondiscriminatory fashion, to deeply held
beliefs that are not traditionally religious). But RFRA does not define the "exercise of
religion," except by reference to the First Amendment, and the Act explicitly states
its intention to leave the Establishment Clause unaffected. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-
2(4), 2000bb-4 (Supp. V 1993). Under these circumstances, the Court could construe
the term "religion" broadly enough to avoid any Establishment Clause issue that
might otherwise be presented. Cf United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965)
(avoiding constitutional questions by construing a military conscientious objector pro-
vision to extend to objectors not holding traditional religious beliefs, despite the
statute's references to "religious training and belief' and "Supreme Being"); accord
Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970); see generally William P. Marshall, The
Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Establishment, Equal Protection, and Free Speech
Concerns, 56 MONT. L. REV. 227 (1995) (arguing that a broad construction of RFRA's
reference to "religion" might be constitutionally required, but that such a construction
might violate the intentions of Congress).
In any event, my claim here is not that RFRA violates the Establishment
Clause, but only that it hinders the judicial development of Establishment Clause
doctrine. See generally Idleman, supra note 130, at 323-26 (discussing the potential
interplay between RFRA and the Establishment Clause).
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At least in the aggregate, these various ramifications of
RFRA seriously frustrate the Supreme Court's development of
coherent constitutional doctrine. The Act adversely affects the
Court's elaboration of constitutional values not only under the
Free Exercise Clause, but also under the Establishment Clause
and other constitutional provisions."' It touches a variety of
constitutional policies that relate and interact in complex ways.
This is a far cry from the discrete and narrow congressional
action that the Court approved in Morgan.'
To recapitulate, RFRA directly repudiates the Supreme
Court's basic constitutional reasoning. As such, it represents an
unprecedented congressional challenge to the Court's well-estab-
lished role as the primary interpreter of the Constitution. The
Act addresses a matter other than racial discrimination, and it
therefore moves beyond the core historical purpose of Section 5.
It impairs federalistic values and undermines the Court's devel-
opment of coherent constitutional doctrine.90 This kind of dra-
matic change in our judicially determined constitutional land-
scape could be accomplished by a constitutional amendment, but
it cannot be done by statute.'' Accordingly, RFRA should be
188. Cf Grumet, 114 S. Ct. at 2497 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in the judgment) (noting the relationship of "the Free Exercise Clause, the Es-
tablishment Clause, the Religious Test Clause, Art. VI, cl. 3, and the Equal Protec-
tion Clause as applied to religion"); Raul F. Yanes & Mary Ann Glendon, FIRST
THINGS, Apr. 1992, at 46, 48 (contribution to How To Restore Religious Freedom: A
Debate) (arguing that "RFRA would be a substantial impediment to the comprehen-
sive reexamination of religion clause case law that the Court now seems prepared to
undertake"); House Committee Hearings, supra note 111, at 303 (testimony of Profes-
sor Robert A. Destro) (noting that RFRA does not address "the connection between
free exercise, freedom of speech, equal protection, due process, and all the other
constitutional rights we hold dear").
189. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966); see supra notes 42-54 and
accompanying text.
190. All of these problems are exacerbated if RFRA is read to adopt a form of
strict scrutiny that is even more protective of religious free exercise than pre-Smith
judicial doctrine, thereby moving the Act even further from the constitutional values
of the Supreme Court. See House Committee Hearings, supra note 111, at 377-85
(testimony of Professor Ira C. Lupu).
191. As Justice Harlan wrote in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970):
Congress is subject to none of the institutional restraints imposed on judi-
cial decisionmaking; it is controlled only by the political process. In Article
V, the Framers expressed the view that the political restraints on Congress
alone were an insufficient control over the process of constitution making.
The concurrence of two-thirds of each House and of three-fourths of the
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declared unconstitutional in its application to state and local
governmental practices." 2
IV. RFRA: A CONSTITUTIONALLY SIGNIFICANT STATUTE
To conclude that RFRA is unconstitutional is not to suggest
that the Act is constitutionally irrelevant. Much to the contrary,
the Act is a powerful statement that Congress rejects the Su-
preme Court's interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause, as
announced in Employment Division v. Smith,"3 and favors a
considerably broader interpretation. Furthermore, the Act was
adopted with overwhelming political support, so powerful as to
suggest a national consensus. Because the Act is unconstitution-
al, the Act's vision of religious freedom is not binding on the
Supreme Court, and the Court should decline to embrace it if the
Court continues to adhere to the competing vision of Smith. But
the Court should not lightly dismiss RFRA, viewed as a political
declaration concerning the proper meaning of the Free Exercise
Clause.
From this perspective, the Act's particular provisions are
less important than its essential statement of constitutional
policy. So understood, the Act provides compelling evidence that
our contemporary national values support a generous regime of
religious freedom-one that provides protection even from laws
of general application-and this evidence should properly inform
the Court's interpretation of the Constitution. Indeed, when
coupled with other constitutional arguments, the enactment of
RFRA strongly suggests that the Supreme Court should recon-
sider Smith and, on reconsideration, overrule it.
A. Determining the Meaning of the Free Exercise Clause
Whether Smith should be overruled, of course, depends upon
the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause. A determination of this
States was needed for the political check to be adequate.
Id. at 205 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
192. After completing this Article, I learned that Professor Marci A. Hamil-
ton-working independently from me and advancing a rather different set of argu-
ments-also has concluded that RFRA exceeds the power of Congress under § 5.
Hamilton claims that the Act is unconstitutional not only in its state and local ap-
plications, but also as applied to federal governmental practices. See Marci A. Hamil-
ton, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Letting the Fox into the Henhouse Under
Cover of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. (1995) (forth-
coming).
193. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
1995]
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meaning in turn requires an evaluation of various consider-
ations. As with the interpretation of any constitutional provision,
the constitutional text is the obvious starting point, followed by
an examination of the original understanding of the framers and
ratifiers. Other factors are also relevant, including judicial prece-
dents that have interpreted the provision in the past, as well as
considerations of institutional competence and political theory.
Based on these sorts of factors, Professor Michael W.
McConnell has strongly criticized the Smith decision."' He con-
tends that the Court "gave insufficient weight to the text" of the
Free Exercise Clause'95 and ignored the history of its adop-
tion'--a history that McConnell had documented in a major
article that was awaiting publication when the Court announced
its decision.'97 Smith's treatment of precedent, according to
McConnell, was "troubling, bordering on the shocking."'98 And
Smith's rejection of the Court's pre-Smith doctrine of free exer-
cise exemptions abandoned a valuable and appropriate judicial
role in our democratic system.'99
McConnell's critique of Smith is powerful. Others also have
criticized Smith, arguing that the Court's interpretation of the
Free Exercise Clause was wrong.2 0 These various commenta-
tors have fully canvassed a range of arguments based on text,
history, and precedent, as well as institutional considerations
and political theory. These arguments are telling, and they may
themselves provide reason enough to overrule Smith. Rather
than rehearse these arguments further, however, I wish to elabo-
rate an additional factor that also should inform the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause: our society's
contemporary understanding of what the clause should mean.
194. Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision,
57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109 (1990).
195. Id. at 1116.
196. Id. at 1116-19.
197. Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free
Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409 (1990).
198. McConnell, supra note 194, at 1120.
199. Id. at 1141-52.
200. E.g., Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV.
1; Stephen Pepper, Conflicting Paradigms of Religious Freedom: Liberty Versus Equal-
ity, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 7; Harry F. Tepker, Jr., Hallucinations of Neutrality in the
Oregon Peyote Case, 16 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1 (1991). There is contrary scholarly
opinion as well, supporting the basic approach of Smith, if not the Court's rationale.
See, e.g., William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58
U. Cm. L. REV. 308 (1991).
[Vol. 56
42
Montana Law Review, Vol. 56 [1995], Iss. 1, Art. 3
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol56/iss1/3
1995] CONSTITUTIONAL SIGNIFICANCE
B. The Relevance of Contemporary Societal Values in
Constitutional Interpretation
The determination of constitutional rights is not, and should
not be, an entirely backward-looking process. Rather, constitu-
tional decisionmaking properly includes an evolutionary compo-
nent,2 1 according to which the Supreme Court considers not
merely the values of the past, but also those of the present.2'
Contemporary societal thinking represents a cultural fact that
the Court cannot ignore. No less important, it may reflect a pro-
gression of political-moral opinion that accords enhanced protec-
tion to individual rights and that, on its merits, invites judicial
emulation. Indeed, on many issues of individual rights, our histo-
ry reveals changes in societal thinking that are widely accepted
as positive developments.2 3 In such cases, the evolution of soci-
etal values may properly suggest the growth of a constitutional
principle beyond its original meaning.'"
201. As Professor Paul W. Kahn has demonstrated, the theme of constitutional
evolution or growth-in one form or another-has long been a part of the American
constitutional tradition. See PAUL W. KAHN, LEGITIMACY AND HISTORY: SELF-GOVERN-
MENT IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 65-133 (1992).
202. Elsewhere I have elaborated and defended an understanding of constitution-
al interpretation that includes this evolutionary component. See, e.g., Daniel 0.
Conkle, The Legitimacy of Judicial Review in Individual Rights Cases: Michael
Perry's Constitutional Theory and Beyond, 69 MINN. L. REV. 587, 625-64 (1985). Por-
tions of the following discussion draw upon this earlier work.
203. Consider, for example, America's historical progress in protecting the indi-
vidual rights of Blacks, ethnic minorities, and women. As Professor Robert N. Bellah
has noted:
[SIimultaneous with widespread evidence of corruption has been continuous
pressure for higher standards of moral behavior. Eighteenth-century Ameri-
cans with a few notable exceptions tolerated slavery; we do not. Nineteenth-
century Americans tolerated violence and discrimination against immigrants
and ethnic minorities; we do not. The early 20th century tolerated the no-
tion that women were basically inferior to men, even while giving them the
right to vote; we do not. In the treatment of blacks, ethnic minorities, and
women we still have far to go, but it would be hard to argue that we were
better in these respects at any earlier period in our history.
ROBERT N. BELLAH, THE BROKEN COVENANT: AMERICAN CIVIL RELIGION IN TIME OF
TRIAL at xi-xii (1975).
204. Cf ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 236 (1962) ("The function of the Justices . . . [is] to
extract 'fundamental presuppositions' from their deepest selves, but in fact from the
evolving morality of our tradition.") (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S.
234, 267 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)); CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., DECISION AC-
CORDING TO LAW 39-42 (1981) (discussing constitutional decisionmaking based on
"national ethical consensus"); MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS,
AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INQUIRY INTO THE LEGITIMACY OF CONSTITUTIONAL
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In various contexts, the Supreme Court and individual jus-
tices have indicated that the Constitution's meaning is not static.
Interpreting the Due Process Clause, for example, the Court in
Rochin v. California explained that the meaning of individual
rights provisions often is not fixed by "the deposit of history," but
rather may depend on "a continuing process of application," re-
sulting in judgments that are "bound to fall differently at differ-
ent times."2 5 This exercise of judgment, the Court continued,
cannot "be avoided by freezing 'due process of law' at some fixed
stage of time or thought;" ' rather, judges must be "duly mind-
ful of reconciling the needs both of continuity and of change in a
progressive society."2 7 To the same effect was Justice Harlan's
eloquent opinion in Poe v. Ullman:
Due process has not been reduced to any formula; its content
cannot be determined by reference to any code. The best that
can be said is that through the course of this Court's decisions
it has represented the balance which our Nation, built upon
postulates of respect for the liberty of the individual, has struck
between that liberty and the demands of organized society....
The balance of which I speak is the balance struck by this
country, having regard to what history teaches are the tradi-
tions from which it developed as well as the traditions from
which it broke. That tradition is a living thing.2 8
POLICYMAKING BY THE JUDICIARY 99 (1982) (arguing that America's self-understanding
includes a commitment "to bring our collective (political) practice into ever closer
harmony with our evolving, deepening moral understanding"); Harry H. Wellington,
Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudica-
tion, 83 YALE L.J. 221 (1973) (defending the constitutionalization of America's "con-
temporary morality").
205. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169-70 (1952). In Rochin, the Court held
that California police had violated a criminal suspect's due process rights when they
administered a stomach pump against his will to obtain evidence of illicit narcotics.
Id. at 174.
206. Id. at 171.
207. Id. at 172.
208. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also id.
at 518 n.9 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (noting that "due process follows the advancing
standards of a free society"). Poe involved a substantive due process challenge to a
Connecticut statute criminalizing the use of contraceptives, even by married persons.
A majority of the Court dismissed the challenge without reaching the merits, con-
cluding that the appeal did not present a justiciable "case or controversy." Id. at 508-
09 (plurality opinion); id. at 509 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). Justices
Harlan and Douglas dissented from this dismissal and would have found the con-
traceptive ban unconstitutional. See id. at 522-55 (Harlan, J., dissenting); id. at 509-
22 (Douglas, J., dissenting). In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), the
Supreme Court later reached the merits of the Connecticut law and agreed that it
was invalid.
At his confirmation hearings, Justice Breyer referred with approval to Justice
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The Court has utilized similar reasoning in its equal protec-
tion decisions. In Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, for ex-
ample, the Court explained that the meaning of equal protection
evolves over time:
In determining what lines are unconstitutionally discriminato-
ry, we have never been confined to historic notions of equality,
any more than we have restricted due process to a fixed cata-
logue of what was at a given time deemed to be the limits of
fundamental rights. Notions of what constitutes equal treat-
ment for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause do
change.'
Citing the Court's rejection in Brown v. Board of Education210
of the "separate-but-equal" doctrine previously endorsed in Plessy
v. Ferguson,"' the Court in Harper asserted that equal protec-
tion claims must be heard with "a contemporary ear."212
Likewise, the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment decisions
have been guided in part by a consideration of "the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing soci-
ety."213 As far back as Weems v. United States, the Court wrote
that the Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punish-
ments "is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning
as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice.""14
The Court explained: "Time works changes, brings into existence
new conditions and purposes. Therefore a principle to be vital
must be capable of wider application than the mischief which
gave it birth."215
Harlan's approach, stating that the meaning of constitutionally protected "liberty"
depends not only on text, history, tradition, and precedent, but also on "the condi-
tions of life in the past, the present, and a little bit of projection into the future."
Excerpts from Hearing on Breyer Nomination to High Court, N.Y. TIMEs, July 14,
1994, at D22. According to Justice Breyer, this "is what the Court has done, and
virtually every Justice." Id.
209. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966) (citation omit-
ted). In Harper, the Court invalidated Virginia's poll tax as a violation of equal pro-
tection, noting that "[o]nly a handful of States" continued to employ such taxes at
the time of the Court's decision. Id. at 666 n.4.
210. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
211. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
212. Harper, 383 U.S. at 669; cf. Brown, 347 U.S. at 492 ("[We cannot turn the
clock back to 1868 when the Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy
v. Ferguson was written.").
213. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion).
214. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910).
215. Id. at 373.
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C. The Role of Objective Indicators of Contemporary Societal
Values, Including Congressional Legislation
Although judicial references to the evolving meaning of the
Constitution tend to be general in nature, some include more
specific statements concerning the relevance of contemporary
societal values and how the Supreme Court might determine
what those values are. Under the Eighth Amendment, for exam-
ple, the Court has looked to objective indicators of contemporary
values, including legislative policymaking as well as the sentenc-
ing decisions of juries. "In determining what standards have
'evolved,"' the Court wrote in Stanford v. Kentucky, "we have
looked not to our own conceptions of decency, but to those of
modern American society as a whole."21 Accordingly, the
Court's analysis has included a comparison of the penalty under
review with penalties imposed for similar crimes within the
same jurisdiction and in other American jurisdictions as well.
Utilizing this approach, the Court in Coker v. Georgia ruled
that the death penalty for rape was unconstitutional, in part
because this punishment had all but disappeared from the Amer-
ican legal system. 17 The Court relied on a similar analysis in
Enmund v. Florida." In Enmund, the Court refused to allow
the death penalty to be imposed "solely because the defendant
somehow participated in a robbery in the course of which a mur-
der was committed." 9 In support of its ruling, the Court noted
that only eight states authorized such a punishment" ° and
that juries rarely imposed it.221 To the same effect, the Court in
Thompson v. Oklahoma222 relied on a review of relevant legisla-
216. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 (1989).
217. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 593-97 (1977) (plurality opinion); cf Gregg
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179-81 (1976) (plurality opinion) (finding that widespread
legislative readoption of the death penalty for murder after the Court's decision in
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), worked to undercut the argument that
contemporary societal values condemned this penalty).
218. 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
219. Id. at 792.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 794-96. The reach of Enmund was limited in Tison v. Arizona, 481
U.S. 137 (1987), which held that the death penalty could be imposed on a felony
participant who neither killed nor intended to kill, as long as he had major personal
involvement in the felony and showed a reckless indifference to human life. Id. at
158. The Court relied on a survey of state felony-murder laws and judicial decisions
after Enmund, which indicated to the Court's satisfaction a societal consensus that
permitted the death penalty in these circumstances. Id. at 152-55.
222. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
[Vol. 56
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tive enactments and jury determinations to support its conclu-
sion that the Eighth Amendment imposes limitations on the
execution of juveniles. According to the plurality, these "indica-
tors of contemporary standards of decency"22 revealed that "the
imposition of the death penalty on a 15-year-old offender is now
generally abhorrent to the conscience of the community. " '
The Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment decisions are un-
usually direct in their reliance on societal values as a source of
constitutional judgment.225 But even in other areas, there have
been suggestions that contemporary American values should
inform the Court's constitutional decisionmaking, and that objec-
tive indicators, such as legislation, may be the best evidence of
what those values are.
In Griffin v. Illinois,22 for instance, the Court ruled that
indigent criminal defendants were constitutionally entitled to
publicly provided transcripts for purposes of appeal, in part be-
cause the denial of such transcripts was out of step with the
contemporary practice of most states. As the plurality opinion
noted:
T~o deny adequate review to the poor means that many of
them may lose their life, liberty or property because of unjust
convictions which appellate courts would set aside. Many States
have recognized this and provided aid for convicted defendants
223. Id. at 823 (plurality opinion).
224. Id. at 832. Concurring in the judgment, Justice O'Connor believed that the
case could be decided on narrower grounds. But she endorsed the plurality's objective
inquiry concerning "the relevant social consensus," and she agreed that "a national
consensus forbidding the execution of any person for a crime committed before the
age of 16 very likely does exist." Id. at 848-49 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judg-
ment). The dissenters conducted the same type of analysis, but concluded, in their
judgment, that no such consensus was present. See id. at 859-78 (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing). The Court used a similar analysis in Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361
(1989), but there a majority determined that there was no national consensus forbid-
ding the death penalty for juveniles who were 16 or older at the time of their of-
fense. See id. at 368-74.
In Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983), the Court extended its comparative
analysis to noncapital cases, invalidating a life sentence for a nonviolent recidivist
when the defendant apparently had been "treated more severely than he would have
been in any other State." Id. at 300. The precise role of Solem's comparative analysis
for noncapital cases, however, has been placed in question by the Court's fractured
decision in Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
225. This may reflect the particular nature of the Eighth Amendment inquiry. As
the plurality wrote in Thompson: "Part of the rationale for this index of constitution-
al value lies in the very language of the construed clause: whether an action is
'unusual' depends, in common usage, upon the frequency of its occurrence or the
magnitude of its acceptance." 487 U.S. at 822 n.7.
226. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
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who have a right to appeal and need a transcript but are un-
able to pay for it. A few have not. Such a denial is a misfit in a
country dedicated to affording equal justice to all and special
privileges to none in the administration of its criminal law. 7
Likewise, in Tennessee v. Garner, the Court construed the Fourth
Amendment to depart from the common law rule concerning
police use of deadly force when "the long-term movement has
been away from the rule that deadly force may be used against
any fleeing felon, and [when] that remains the rule in less than
half the states." 5
Speaking for three justices in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Center, Justice Marshall explained the relevance of legis-
lation as an indicator of contemporary values under the Equal
Protection Clause as well as other constitutional provisions:
Courts. . . do not sit or act in a social vacuum. Moral phi-
losophers may debate whether certain inequalities are absolute
wrongs, but history makes clear that constitutional principles
of equality, like constitutional principles of liberty, property,
and due process, evolve over time; what once was a "natural"
and "self-evident" ordering later comes to be seen as an artifi-
cial and invidious constraint on human potential and freedom.
Shifting cultural, political, and social patterns at times come to
make past practices appear inconsistent with fundamental
principles upon which American society rests, an inconsistency
legally cognizable under the Equal Protection Clause. It is
natural that evolving standards of equality come to be embod-
ied in legislation. When that occurs, courts should look to the
fact of such change as a source of guidance on evolving princi-
ples of equality.'
227. Id. at 19 (plurality opinion) (footnotes omitted).
228. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 18 (1985).
229. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 466 (1985) (Mar-
shall, J., joined by Brennan and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part) (citations omitted).
The Supreme Court's consideration of contemporary legislative action can be
encompassed within a constitutional theory that focuses on tradition, at least in the
sense described by Justice Harlan in Poe. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
As Professor Robert F. Nagel has explained:
Ilt is an obvious oversimplification to conceive of tradition as unchanging.
Experience accumulates by way of experimentation and adaptation. Contem-
porary political behavior, including official recalcitrance, is a part of our
collective life and is relevant to understanding our underlying traditions.
Presumably, this is why Justices as different as Brennan, Blackmun, and
Scalia have all examined patterns of modern statutory change when depict-
ing legal traditions.
Robert F. Nagel, Disagreement and Interpretation, 56 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Au-
[Vol. 56
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As Justice Marshall makes clear, the relevant values are not
those of a particular state or geographic region, but rather of
"American society" in general. These values may be demonstrat-
ed by a broad pattern of state legislation or, better still, by Acts
of Congress, which speak for the American people as a
whole.' 0
Frontiero v. Richardson231 demonstrates the importance of
congressional legislation as an indicator of contemporary nation-
al values and therefore as a source of constitutional meaning. In
Frontiero, four justices argued that sex-based classifications
should be found constitutionally "suspect" under the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. 2 They relied in part
on recent congressional action "manifest[ing] an increasing sensi-
tivity to sex-based classifications,"233 including not only
Congress' adoption of statutory prohibitions on sex-based dis-
crimination in employment, but also its passage of the proposed
Equal Rights Amendment.' "Congress itself has concluded
that classifications based upon sex are inherently invidious,"
wrote the four-justice plurality, "and this conclusion of a coequal
branch of Government is not without significance to the question
presently under consideration."' Although the plurality's ar-
gument for strict scrutiny did not prevail in Frontiero, the Su-
preme Court eventually did adopt an elevated constitutional
standard for sex-based classifications. 6 This standard plainly
reflects the evolution of societal thinking on sexual equality, an
evolution that is amply documented by the congressional action
on which the Frontiero plurality relied.
D. RFRA as an Indicator of Contemporary Societal Values
Like other individual rights provisions, the Free Exercise
Clause can be informed by contemporary societal values. And as
in Frontiero, recent congressional legislation-in this case,
tumn 1993, at 11, 21.
230. Cf BLACK, supra note 204, at 41 ("As to issues of national consensus, the
presumption has to be that Congress is the empowered voice.").
231. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
232. Id. at 682-88 (plurality opinion).
233. Id. at 687.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 687-88.
236. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) ( [Cllassifications by gender
must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to
achievement of those objectives.").
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RFRA-provides strong evidence of what those values are. Under
this argument, RFRA is tremendously important, not because
the statute does or could supersede the Supreme Court's consti-
tutional ruling in Smith, 7 but rather because it provides com-
pelling evidence of contemporary national values-values that
should help inform the Court's own judgment. The fact that the
Act is unconstitutional and therefore not binding by its terms
does not defeat this argument." Like the unratified Equal
Rights Amendment, RFRA represents a formal and strongly
supported statement of congressional opinion that is not legally
controlling, but that warrants substantial judicial consider-
ation.239
In an attempt to determine contemporary societal values,
the nature and degree of support for congressional legislation are
as relevant as the fact of its enactment. In this respect, it is
notable that although Congress, in adopting RFRA, gave little
consideration to the issue of its power under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment,2" it carefully evaluated the merits of
Smith.2" Based on this evaluation, Congress formally stated its
opinion that the decision was wrong, and it formally stated the
reasons for its position.u2 No less important, the congressional
support for RFRA was almost unanimous. In the House, the Act
was passed by voice vote without objection; 243 in the Senate, it
was adopted by a vote of 97 to 3.244
Furthermore, the Act was promoted by what Representative
237. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
238. Cf Stephen L. Carter, The Morgan "Power" and the Forced Reconsideration
of Constitutional Decisions, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 819, 851-62 (1986) (arguing that the
congressional enactment of unconstitutional statutes can play a role in constitutional
dialogue).
239. In an argument that is sympathetic with mine, Professor Lupu has sug-
gested that RFRA and other "[sitatutes revolving in substantive constitutional orbits"
are part of the process of constitutional change and are potential sources of constitu-
tional meaning. See Lupu, supra note 103, at 76-82. Lupu seems not to recognize,
however, that the Supreme Court could utilize a statute such as RFRA for this pur-
pose even as it declares the statute unconstitutional.
240. See supra notes 102-12 and accompanying text.
241. See, e.g., HousE REPORT, supra note 104; SENATE REPORT, supra note 104.
242. See supra text accompanying notes 95-99, 123, 125 (discussing RFRA's for-
mal statement of findings and purposes).
243. 139 CONG. REC. H2363 (daily ed. May 11, 1993) (adopting House bill); id.
at H8715 (daily ed. Nov. 3, 1993) (concurring in Senate amendment).
244. 139 CONG. REC. S14471 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1993); cf Laycock & Thomas,
supra note 6, at 244 ("The lopsided votes in both houses should send a strong mes-
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Brooks called an "unprecedented coalition,"' one that included
a wide and diverse array of groups-secular and religious, liberal
and conservative." This "Coalition for the Free Exercise of Re-
ligion" ultimately included well over fifty organizations.2 7 Its
membership "spanned the theological and ideological spectrum
from the Southern Baptist Convention to the National Council of
Churches, from the Christian Legal Society to the ACLU, from
the Traditional Values Coalition to People for the American
Way."M According to Senator Hatch, it was "one of the broad-
est coalitions ever assembled to support a bill before Con-
gress."" Given the breadth of support for RFRA both within
and outside of Congress, it would be difficult to imagine a piece
of congressional legislation that could more powerfully demon-
strate a societal consensus concerning the meaning of a constitu-
tional provision.
As noted above, there are various reasons to believe that
Smith was wrongly decided-reasons based on text, history,
precedent, institutional considerations, and political theory.2"
Even if these reasons are insufficient in themselves, however,
RFRA provides an additional argument for overruling Smith and
returning to pre-Smith doctrine. According to this argument, the
Free Exercise Clause should be construed in light of the values
embraced by the contemporary society that it governs. This does
not mean that contemporary societal values should be a determi-
native factor in constitutional interpretation, either here or in
other contexts. But such values are relevant and important to
the interpretive enterprise, at least when they point toward the
enhancement of individual rights." As RFRA convincingly
245. 139 CONG. REC. H2357 (daily ed. May 11, 1993) (statement of Rep. Brooks).
246. See id. ("I am proud of how such marvelous diversity was united by a
shared view of the place and role of religion in our society.").
247. See 139 CONG. REc. S14362 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1993) (statement of Sen.
Hatch).
248. Forest D. Montgomery, Common Adversity Works for Common Good, CHRIS-
TIAN LEGAL SOCkY Q., Winter 1993, at 9. See also Clinton Signs Law on Religious
Freedom, supra note 5; Steinfels, supra note 94.
249. 139 CONG. REC. 514352 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1993) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
250. See supra part IV.A.
251. Societal values reflect majoritarian opinion, and they may therefore conflict
with constitutional values, drawn from other sources, that call for the protection of
individual rights and the resistance of competing, majoritarian norms. In such cases,
societal values may be a dubious source of constitutional meaning. In United States
v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990), for instance, the Supreme Court rejected an argu-
ment that newly adopted congressional legislation prohibiting flag burning required
the Court to reassess its decision in Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989), which
had held that flag burning was protected expression under the First Amendment.
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shows, moreover, contemporary American values include a com-
mitment to religious freedom that goes beyond the protection
afforded under Smith. Unlike Smith, the societal commitment
embodied in RFRA includes significant protection for religiously
motivated conduct even from laws of general application. 2
V. CONCLUSION
Understood as an embodiment of contemporary values,
RFRA is relevant to the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
Free Exercise Clause, but it is not binding on the Court.'
Viewing the statute in this fashion avoids the constitutional
problems that would be created if the statute were held to be
constitutionally valid and therefore enforceable by its terms.'
On this view, the Supreme Court remains the primary interpret-
er of the Constitution, for it, not Congress, makes the ultimate
decision concerning the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause. Ac-
cordingly, the Court can consider the full range of relevant con-
siderations in deciding whether Smith should be reaffirmed or
rejected, and its judgment on these matters might differ from
that of Congress. More generally, the Court remains free to de-
The Court explained:
We decline the Government's invitation to reassess [Johnson) in light of
Congress' recent recognition of a purported national consensus favoring a
prohibition on flag burning. Even assuming such a consensus exists, any
suggestion that the Government's interest in suppressing speech becomes
more weighty as popular opposition to that speech grows is foreign to the
First Amendment.
Eichman, 496 U.S. at 318 (citation omitted); cf Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S.
Ct. 2791, 2815 (1992) (resisting "political pressure" to overrule Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973), and refusing "to overrule under fire" the essential holding of that deci-
sion).
In the context of RFRA, by contrast, the majority's impulse is not to impose
majoritarian norms at the expense of individual rights, but rather to enhance the
protection of individual rights by restricting the scope of majoritarian power. As the
Supreme Court cases that I have discussed suggest, it is in this rights-enhancing
context that arguments based on national societal values are likely to play a signifi-
cant role in the interpretive process. See supra parts lV.B. & IV.C.
252. As a broadly worded statute, RFRA does not reflect a societal consensus
about the appropriate resolution of particular claims of religious freedom. Rather, it
reflects a societal consensus only at the level of general principle. Even so, to identi-
fy the general principle of RFRA is sufficient to identify a contemporary societal
value that rejects the approach of Smith.
253. As Justice Harlan recognized, this is a critical distinction. Although he
maintained that "a legislative announcement that Congress believes a state law [to
be unconstitutional]" could not bind the Supreme Court, he also understood that "this
kind of declaration is of course entitled to the most respectful consideration ...
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 669-70 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
254. See supra part III.
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velop its constitutional doctrine under the Free Exercise Clause,
the Establishment Clause, and related constitutional provisions.
Marbury v. Madison.. is in no way threatened.
Although the Court remains free to act as it will, RFRA
demonstrates that contemporary American values support the
protection of religiously motivated conduct even from laws of
general application. Coupled with other constitutional argu-
ments, the Act therefore suggests that Smith should be over-
ruled. Given the Court's own constitutional obligations, the
Court might well ignore particular aspects of the statute. If the
Court places a higher value than Congress on the importance of
federalistic values, it might wish to reject the Act's stringent
formulation of strict scrutiny and instead adopt a less demand-
ing version of heightened review. 6 For reasons of federalism
as well as constitutional coherency, the Court likewise might not
extend its heightened scrutiny to the free exercise claims of pris-
oners."5 No matter how the Supreme Court addresses the par-
255. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
256. If so, this might return the Court to the actual substance of pre-Smith
doctrine, which appeared to embrace a relatively lenient version of strict scrutiny.
See supra note 79 and accompanying text; see also McConnell, supra note 194, at
1127 (arguing that "the Supreme Court before Smith did not really apply a genuine
'compelling interest' test," and that the Court's actual "more relaxed standard" was
constitutionally correct).
257. Notably, the application of RFRA to prisoners' claims was contested in the
Senate, which considered an amendment that would have removed such claims from
the scope of the Act. Although the amendment was defeated, the debate was vigorous
and the vote was reasonably close, 58-41, indicating that the congressional support
for including prisoners' claims was not nearly as broad as the support for RFRA in
general. See 139 CONG. REc. S14353-68 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1993); id. at S14461-68
(daily ed. Oct. 27, 1993). Under the approach I have suggested, this lesser support
for prisoners' claims is relevant to the Court's evaluation of contemporary values, for
it suggests that such values do not so strongly support the protection of prisoners'
claims.
The Senators who opposed the Act's inclusion of prisoners' claims, moreover,
relied heavily on federalistic arguments. In stating his views as a member of the
Senate Judiciary Committee, for example, Senator Simpson emphasized the burden
that RFRA's application to prisons would impose upon the states:
In conclusion, I remain troubled by the prospect of Congress forcing
the states to commit even more of their law enforcement budgets to inmate
litigation. The Federal Bureau of Prisons has slightly over 87,000 inmates
in its care. The states, by contrast, are responsible for nearly 900,000 in-
mates. Should we pass [RFRAI unamended, the lion's share of the bill's
burden will fall directly on the states. At the Committee hearings, there
was not a single witness called to speak on the issue on behalf of the state
Attorneys General or the correctional administrators.
SENATE REPORT, supra note 104, at 23-24 (additional views of Senator Simpson); see
also, e.g., 139 CONG. REC. S14354-57 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1993) (statement of Sen.
Reid) (arguing that the application of the Act to prisons would impose financial and
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ticular issues that Congress confronted in RFRA, however, the
Court should not ignore the basic message of the Act: that Smith
was wrong and that general laws should not be immune from
serious judicial scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause."'
As the Supreme Court recently explained in Planned Parent-
hood v. Casey, "Our Constitution is a covenant running from the
first generation of Americans to us and then to future genera-
tions. It is a coherent succession. . . [that] embod[ies] ideas and
aspirations that must survive more ages than one. " " As this
language suggests, a proper interpretation of the Constitution
must mediate past and present. The founding generation wrote
the Free Exercise Clause, but our generation necessarily must
decide its present-day meaning. In the Religious Freedom Resto-
ration Act, Congress has expressed its understanding of the pres-
ent-day meaning of the clause. To protect its constitutionally
appointed role, the Supreme Court should rule that as applied to
state and local governmental practices, the Act is unconstitution-
al and therefore not binding on the Court. At the same time,
however, the Court's constitutional role requires its best judg-
ment concerning the meaning of the Constitution, and, as I have
indicated, contemporary societal values are relevant to this deci-
sion. °
other hardships on the states and noting that the proposed amendment excluding
prisoners' claims was supported by "all 50 state prison directors," "a majority of the
State attorneys general," and "many, many Governors"). In conducting its own consti-
tutional evaluation, the Court might conclude that the congressional majority gave
too little weight to these federalistic concerns.
258. As President Clinton stated when he signed RFRA into law: "What this law
basically says is that the Government should be held to a very high level of proof
before it interferes with someone's free exercise of religion. This judgment is shared
by the people of the United States as well as by the Congress." Remarks on Signing
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 29 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 2377,
2378 (Nov. 16, 1993); cf Frederick M. Gedicks, RFRA and the Possibility of Justice,
56 MoNT. L. REV. 95, 117 (1995) ("There is no formal apparatus that will require the
Court to listen to what the country is telling it in RFRA, but having been sent, the
message may be hard to ignore.").
259. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2833 (1992).
260. In the exercise of its own interpretive decisionmaking, the Court conceivably
might act not only to overrule Smith, but also to embrace substantive constitutional
standards that are essentially the same as the statutory provisions of RFRA, includ-
ing the Act's formulation of strict scrutiny and its treatment of prisoners' claims. If
this were to occur, RFRA might be "constitutional" after all, but only in the sense
that it would not conflict with the then-controlling constitutional doctrine of the Su-
preme Court. If my argument in this Article is sound, the Act still would be uncon-
stitutional in the sense that it would not be legally binding on the Court, which
would remain free to revise and develop its constitutional doctrine in ways that
might conflict with the Act's provisions. More specifically, the Act would not preclude
a future Supreme Court decision reverting to the doctrine of Smith.
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RFRA forcefully testifies to a contemporary societal commit-
ment to religious freedom, even in the context of laws of general
application. Combined with other arguments, the enactment of
RFRA therefore suggests that Smith's interpretation of the Free
Exercise Clause was wrong. However ironic it may seem, then, it
would be altogether fitting for the Supreme Court to rely upon
RFRA as a reason for overruling Smith, even as it declares the
Act unconstitutional.26 '
261. In his contribution to this symposium, Professor Lupu addresses the issue
of Congress' power to enact RFRA, and he echoes several of the concerns that I have
discussed. See Lupu, A Lawyer's Guide, supra note 179, at 212-19. But Lupu con-
tends that the Act could be construed narrowly in order to protect its constitutional
validity, and therefore its quality as a legally binding statute. This narrowing con-
struction apparently would extend to RFRA's application to federal laws and
practices, even though the constitutional concerns about RFRA would not readily
support a narrowing construction at that level. See id. at 219-25. Lupu further sug-
gests that the Act might be treated as a quasi-constitutional enactment, and that it
might ultimately be read to afford a more generous version of religious freedom. Id.
at 224-25.
Contrary to Professor Lupu, I do not believe that the Act can or should be
saved from constitutional invalidation in its application to state and local governmen-
tal practices. See supra part III. Further, I think it highly unlikely that saving the
Act by a narrowing construction, as Lupu proposes, would serve to advance the de-
velopment of meaningful religious freedom. A more promising path in this direction
would begin with a Supreme Court decision invalidating RFRA in its state and local
applications, but also overruling Smith. At the same time, RFRA might remain in
full force at the federal level, potentially providing enhanced religious freedom in
that context.
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